

**THE NEW TOTALITARIANS:
SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND RADICAL ISLAMIST
POLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY**

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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FOREWORD


Much discussion has occurred over a possible “clash of civilizations” between the Muslim world and the West for the last decade. While controversial, the “clash” thesis has had a large influence in the debate over the causes of, and possible remedies for, the spread of terrorist activity.

Dr. Douglas Macdonald argues that the social identity theory behind the “clash” thesis is useful for analyzing the tasks before us in the “Long War” on Terrorism. The “clash of civilizations” is not actually occurring, he argues, but is rather the end goal of radical Islamist political grand strategy. This is largely the result of the totalitarian nature of the beliefs of the radical Islamist terrorists: like the Fascists and Communists before them, they ultimately cannot allow alternative value systems to exist in areas they control. Their goal is to spread such totalitarian beliefs to the *ummah*, that is, the entire Muslim world, in order to create a violent “clash” with non-Muslim societies, and, in some versions, radical Islam is expected to spread to the entire world. Unlike some recent academic calls for negotiations with the radical Islamists and arguments that their goals are limited and negotiable, Dr. Macdonald argues that the first thing to understand about the enemy is that there is nothing to negotiate with them because of their radical totalitarian nature. He warns that, historically, Western liberals have had difficulty understanding this type of threat.

Dr. Macdonald argues that the first imperative of any strategy in the “Long War” on Terror must be to prevent such a totalitarian *ummah* from being created in order to prevent a “clash of civilizations.” This can best be

accomplished by supporting the majority of mainstream Muslims, rewarding moves towards moderation, and avoiding unnecessary irritants to Muslim sensibilities. He also argues that we should promote the adoption of “dual identities,” one Muslim, one national, to detract from the lure of pan-Islamism. This approach has been adopted in separatist insurgencies in Indonesia and the Philippines, and initial results are encouraging, at least in Indonesia. The singular “national identity” approach in Thailand has been much less successful thus far, and already has failed in the Philippines. Perhaps more controversial to some, he also advocates continuing to support the spread of democracy and free markets, despite inherent resistance to such “Globalization,” as a part of the “Long War” on Terrorism. But this also must be accompanied by robust security vigilance. Such combined strategies of attraction and attrition, he feels, are the most likely to succeed over the long run.

The debate over grand strategy in the “Long War” on Terrorism is a robust one. Dr. Macdonald’s use of social identity theory to provide a framework to understand the terrorist enemy and how to deal with him moves that debate forward. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present that analytical framework for our readers’ consideration.


DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS J. MACDONALD is a Visiting Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. He is on temporary leave from Colgate University where he has taught for 18 years in the Department of Political Science, and is a former director of the university's International Relations Program. He served in the U.S. Air Force from 1967 to 1971. Dr. Macdonald's doctoral dissertation won the American Political Science Association's Helen Dwight Reid Award for best dissertation in the field of international relations in 1986-1987. The dissertation was published by Harvard University Press in 1992 as *Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World*. In addition, Dr. Macdonald has published articles in *International Security*, *Security Studies*, and various edited collections. His latest article on the Philippines is being published under the auspices of the Center for Civil-Military Relations located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Dr. Macdonald was awarded a John M. Olin Post-doctoral Fellowship in National Security Affairs at Harvard University in 1985-86, and a Senior Research Fellowship at the Norwegian Nobel Institute in 1998. His research interests center on American foreign policy formation, especially towards the Pacific region. He is currently writing a book on ideology and international conflict. Dr. Macdonald received his B.A. from the University of Massachusetts, and the M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. from Columbia University, New York.

SUMMARY

Academic and journalistic critics of the American “Long War” on Terrorism (LWT) who are calling for negotiations with radical Islamist groups, to attempt to appease such groups by meeting their allegedly limited demands, or to accept that they do not represent a major threat to the United States and its interests, are fundamentally wrong. There are many reasons for this, but the major flaw in such reasoning is a lack of understanding of the ideologically-driven grand political strategy of the Islamist extremists, which represents a totalitarian, transnational, and, in many versions, universalist social revolutionary movement. Moderate rationalists steeped in bargaining over flexibly defined interests have difficulty understanding the rigidity of historical “necessity” or moral imperatives in the totalitarian mindset. Policy advice that flows from such misunderstanding is therefore fatuous, if not dangerous. A proper understanding of the grand political strategy chosen by the terrorists is a prerequisite for constructing effective counterpolicies.

A useful framework for understanding the ideology and grand political strategy of extremist Islamist terrorist groups such as those affiliated with al-Qa’ida is through the use of social identity theories. The radical Islamists are attempting to alter the social identity of the entire Muslim world (the *ummah*) in a direction of civilizational unity in order to struggle subsequently against other civilizational groups, often defined religiously, but including secular humanists also. Samuel Huntington’s theory of an emerging “clash of civilizations” may or may not have a universal applicability, but it is highly relevant to studying the

grand political strategy of certain Islamist extremist groups. Radical Islamist group leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Indonesia's Emir Abu Bakar Bashir openly advocate such a clash in civilizational social identity terms. Indeed, bin Laden has declared that it already has been begun by the West.

The ideas behind the political grand strategy to bring about a clash of civilizations have long historical roots. Yet they evolved rapidly into more terrorist means following the 1967 Arab war with Israel. Ideally, the strategy was to follow two stages. The first stage was to be the overthrow of secularist or moderate Muslim governments, the "near enemy," to unify the *ummah* under strict *sharia* (Islamist, God-given, Koranic) law and totalitarian Islamist political leadership. The second was to be a now-unified *ummah* confronting the rest of the world, the "far enemy," with the ultimate triumph of radical Islam on a global scale. This timetable was upset, and the political grand strategy altered, when the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) invaded Afghanistan in 1979. This led to attacks on the Soviet "far" enemy, and the radicalizing and unifying experience of defeating the Soviets in that country. Muslims from all over the *ummah* participated in the Afghani *jihad*. Returning veterans of the anti-Soviet war often created radical Islamist movements upon their return to their country of origin, for example, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Once the Soviets were defeated, the radical Islamists turned to attacking the "far" and "near" enemies simultaneously in the 1990s, with the "far" enemy receiving snowballing attention.

The invasion of Iraq in 1991, and the stationing of allied troops in Saudi Arabia to deter and maintain a sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein, captured the attention of the radical Islamists and, with the

collapse of the USSR, placed the United States first on the list among the “far enemies.” What bin Laden and others perceived as the tepid American response to various provocations, and earlier American withdrawals from Vietnam in 1975, Beirut in 1983, and Somalia in 1993, among other examples, as well as the heady success of defeating the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, emboldened the radical Islamists to the point of occasional delusions of grandeur. Attacks on Americans and U.S. interests continued periodically throughout the 1990s, culminating in the destruction of the Twin Towers in New York City on September 11, 2001 (9/11). The subsequent American-led allied invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq cemented the position of the United States as the great enemy of Islam to the extremists, and even many moderates.

The radical Islamists have used these developments in their recruiting efforts, arguing that the United States has declared war on Islam. They also state this in civilizational social identity terms. Anger in the Muslim world at American actions has offered some recruitment opportunities for the radical Islamists. But thus far they have failed to shape the consciousness of the vast majority of Muslims in a civilizational direction of their choosing. A top priority of American foreign policy must be that this pan-Islamic political grand strategy continues to fail.

The study makes the following policy recommendations:

1. A greater coordination of efforts, both material and ideational, with allies to prevent the LWT from turning into a “clash of civilizations” over social identities as planned by radical Islamist terrorists;
2. More sophisticated and less ethnocentric outreach programs to the non-Western world to

explain the American role in and the potential benefits of Globalization to moderate groups, and a greater emphasis on areas of value congruence;

3. The implementation of a combined “attrition/attraction” strategy in dealing with insurgent groups; and,

4. The promotion of a moderate nationalism and “dual identities” to fend off the potential appeals of a widespread change toward a civilizational identity in the Muslim world, even if at the short-term expense of American economic interests.

THE NEW TOTALITARIANS: SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND RADICAL ISLAMIST POLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY

So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's futures. And we are all mortal.¹

President John F. Kennedy, June 1963

Radical Islamist groups resolutely reject this pluralistic and liberal vision of world order articulated by President Kennedy in 1963.² The war between these groups and America is more than a mere struggle for power, as many self-proclaimed "Realists" would have it, although it is that. It is also a battle over core values. Because of this, the greatest security threat facing the United States in the early 21st century is the terrorist activity propagated by Islamist extremists.³

Although the primary American response understandably has been military and security-oriented in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), this threat cannot be met by material means and methods alone. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine General Peter Pace put it in late 2005, in this war "ideas are as important as bullets."⁴ Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer agrees: "The campaign against this misinterpretation of Islam by terrorist groups involves a battle of ideas."⁵ It is that realm of ideas in terms of extreme Islamist political grand strategy, of which its military grand strategy is only one subordinate

element, which this monograph seeks to analyze and explain.⁶

What follows is an analysis of the political grand strategy of a particular type of that extremism, that is, the attempt to unite the entire Muslim world under an Islamist political order, a politicized transnational *ummah*, or Muslim community, stretching from Morocco (in some versions, Spain and Portugal) to the Philippines, and from Nigeria and Mauritania to Uzbekistan. This is the ultimate goal of the political grand strategy of al-Qa'ida and associated Islamist groups in other regions such as Jemaah Islamiya and Abu Sayyaf in Southeast Asia, although sometimes an eventual global Muslim *ummah* is also posited, at least in their most radical incantations. This virulent strain of Islamism presents the greatest threats to American interests, including homeland defense, through the systematic use of terrorist violence.⁷

ANALYTICAL CAVEATS

Some brief analytical caveats are in order. For the sake of brevity, understanding, and ease of communication, analytical generalizations must be made. I have attempted to be judicious in doing so. Groups will be discussed at times as if they were unified and coherent entities, although they not always are.⁸ It is useful to remember that, on an individual basis, people coming from the same socio-economic groupings, the same countries, the same religion, the same region, even the same family, can have very different reactions to their environment and external stimuli. Individual choices must be made in becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorist behavior.

Nonetheless, it is instructive to identify those group dynamics that make such choices more likely if we

hope to eradicate, to the extent possible, such choices being made in the first place. Most people would agree that this is the ideal way to fight terrorism: eliminate it from occurring, that is, in social science jargon, prevent the in-group political processes from regenerating the terrorist organization through recruitment.⁹ There are former terrorists, but a better strategy would be to influence these people in a moderate direction before they join in the violence. As Jerrold Post, a psychiatrist experienced in dealing with captured terrorists, puts it, **“Terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being.”** [Emphasis in the original.]¹⁰ Prevention is thus the best counterstrategy. But prior to creating a preventative strategy, we must first try to understand what the extreme Islamists are trying to accomplish.

Secondly, much of the content of the Islamist political grand strategy that is accessible comes from public statements of its leaders, the writings of influential radical thinkers, or the statements of captured terrorists. These sources could be filled with disinformation, misinformation, bravado, “cheerleading,” recruitment overtures, and the like. Doctrinal statements are sometimes contradictory, even within the same document. This is because it is likely that extremist Islamist spokesmen contract or expand their messages, depending on the primary target audience.¹¹

Clearly, many of their statements and apparent beliefs are contradictory. The leader of the al-Qa’ida-affiliated, Indonesian-based Islamist terror group Jemaah Islamiya,¹² Abu Bakar Bashir, for example, supported the view at various times in the same

interview that the ultimate goal of his group is: a) a Muslim “super state” limited to Southeast Asia; b) a transnational caliphate encompassing the entire Muslim world; and/or, c) a world in which there will be no non-Muslims at all.¹³ With this sort of strategic flexibility – some would argue strategic incoherence – it is difficult, although not impossible, to explicate a rational strategy held by leading members of the important terror organizations.

The widespread repetition of major themes and stated goals over time, actions taken that are within the parameters of and seemingly inspired by these political grand strategic claims, and the existence of similar ideas in all sorts of captured intelligence materials worldwide which have demonstrated clear communications and connections among the groups, all strongly suggest that, varied utopian goals notwithstanding, there is a coherent political grand strategy that can be understood as animating and loosely coordinating extreme Islamist terrorism of this type. This *political* grand strategy also is supported by a distinctive *military* grand strategy to attain the political goals. The extreme Islamists have been quite forthcoming in advocating those plans. But do they mean what they say? Or are such ideas merely so much palaver to string along the gullible, as many “Realists” might argue?

An instructive lesson can be drawn from the study of the former Soviet Union following the Cold War and the partial opening of confidential files of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Contrary to what revisionist Sovietologists and “Realists” would have predicted, no great disparity existed between what was being said privately by the regime in its inner *sanctum* and what was being said publicly. These analysts predicted that privately Soviet leaders would

have eschewed ideology and spoken in the sparse, instrumental tones of *realpolitik*. That is, they predicted that the USSR would be shown to be a “normal” great power, not an ideologically-driven state.

Unfortunately for this view, the records did not demonstrate that when finally released. To be sure, at times tactics and instrumental policies were discussed in blunt *realpolitik* terms. Some separation was made between issues of “principle” and issues of “propaganda.” But for the most part, the Soviet leaders spoke in ideological terms, sought ideologically-derived goals, viewed the United States and other non-Leninist regimes in ideological terms, and were constrained by the tenets of their belief systems in most areas of policy. As one of the foremost historians of Stalinist diplomacy, Vojtech Mastny, noted in 1996:

Perhaps the greatest surprise so far to have come out of the Russian archives is that there was no surprise: the thinking of the insiders conformed substantially to what Moscow was publicly saying. Some of the most secret documents could have been published in *Pravda* without anybody’s noticing. There was no double bookkeeping; it was the single Marxist-Leninist one whose defects spelled the bankruptcy of the Soviet enterprise in the long run.¹⁴

This same reluctance to believe the ideological statements of the extreme Islamists among Western analysts remains a problem today.¹⁵ James Robbins argues that the fundamental problem lies in the liberal Enlightenment-driven mindset and its endemic, reified rationalism:

Western liberals, who prize reason, are subject to the tendency to explain away beliefs they consider unreasonable. Progress and freedom are inevitable because they are the natural courses of history.

Ideologies that do not fit our predetermined vision of the future are not worth taking seriously. Extremism cannot triumph because it does not make sense. Therefore, the Bolsheviks and their successors were not really after global Communist revolution, even though they said they were. The Nazis would not really commit armed aggression and genocide, even though they advocated both. And while Khmer Rouge military leader Khieu Samphan's 1959 doctoral thesis identified the urban bourgeoisie as a parasite class that had to be removed to the countryside, they wouldn't really empty Phnom Penh of its 2.5 million citizens and subject them to collectivization, reeducation, and execution, would they? Isn't that just plain crazy?¹⁶

Tragically, these belief systems did not turn out to be "crazy" in the events, but rather, in retrospect, consisted of warnings misunderstood by many. Even among the ranks of the most vile radicals, moderate rationalists will attempt to find signs of corresponding moderation in them, at least enough to "do business." It is an article of liberal and "Realist" faith.¹⁷

Yet while liberals and other moderate rationalists think in terms of *interests*, many of which are malleable and can be bargained over and compromised as in liberal political systems, extremist Islamists think in terms of *moral imperatives* and goals that are fixed and unassailable.¹⁸ Among their catalog of crimes committed by moderate, secular, or "apostate" Muslim governments and groups is exactly that they "do business" with the non-Islamic world. Unless they can be deprogrammed to think in different ways, they have to be incarcerated or killed. There is no compromise.

The 9/11 Commission called the cause of that horrible day primarily a "failure of imagination." We cannot afford such failures in the future. Until proven otherwise, the radical Islamists must be taken at their word.

This monograph proceeds as follows: an examination of radical Islamism as a totalitarian ideology and its similarities with other totalitarian ideologies; a general overview of what comprises a *political* grand strategy, as opposed to the more narrow subset of military grand strategy; the ideational template of the extreme Islamist political grand strategy and its interconnection with their military strategy; and some implications for U.S. policies, with some modest policy recommendations.

RADICAL ISLAMISM AS TOTALITARIANISM

I argue here, in contrast to some recent observers, that the radical Islamists are *not* driven toward a “political, limited, and evasive war of attrition” that makes a negotiated settlement possible, if not likely, as a Harvard scholar would have it.¹⁹ Nor are they merely following a limited strategic logic based on national liberation from “occupying” armies, as other scholars aver.²⁰ Nor has the American response to 9/11 been an overreaction to a relatively isolated event, as a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian would have us believe.²¹ Nor is the terrorist threat largely a figment of the American imagination, as some academics appear to argue.²²

These views merely describe Islamist short-term *tactics* for the current situation, which the terrorists themselves have declared to be temporary, without any attention given to the long-term and ultimate goals of the extremist Islamist social and political movement, that is, to its totalistic ideology. Rather, an examination of the political grand strategy of the Islamists demonstrates that they place no inherent limits on either the ends they seek or the means they are willing to utilize in pursuit of those ends.

Moreover, the extremist Islamist political belief system is totalitarian, that is, it ultimately forbids value and moral pluralism (which often is referred to as a form of “polytheism” and a rejection of the one true God)²³ and claims the exclusive right to determine the entire way of life of people under its control. Like Fascism domestically and Leninism universally, radical Islamism seeks the complete eradication of alternative forms of moral, social, and political thought. Some versions desire this totalitarian goal for the *ummah*, that is, the Muslim world as defined by them. Other versions, as we shall see in the statements of Jemaah Islamiya co-founder Abu Bakar Bashir, an Indonesian cleric, aim at gaining the entire world for their view of Islamism. It is therefore incorrect to state, as has CNN’s Peter Bergen in an otherwise very valuable book, that radical Islamism has “articulated no vision of the world it aims to create.”²⁴ Although some parts of this articulated set of ultimate goals remain vague and varying definitions have been articulated, this is not unusual for any ideology.

What follows is not an attempt to pour new wine into old bottles, or to force the current dilemmas faced into a World War II or Cold War framework. Yet the United States and the other liberal states of the world have faced totalitarians before, and it would be foolish for us not to learn from those experiences what we can, as different as they were in many respects. As we shall see, there are also many key similarities with those movements of the past, both in their political nature and in their policies in challenging liberalism.

Since totalitarianism is a contested concept, further explanation of what is meant here is in order.²⁵ Though for analytical coherence disparate groups and their members will be lumped under similar categories (for example, radical Islamist, Jemaah Islamiya, al-Qa’ida,

etc.), it should be emphasized that few such groups are truly monolithic. This raises the important question of whether a totalitarian system has to be highly centralized, as one might intuitively assume, to qualify as totalitarian. I argue here that it does not.

An almost universal belief in the counter terror literature is that al-Qa'ida and its global affiliates are loosely organized groups pursuing similar ultimate ends.²⁶ This centrifugal tendency has increased in the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by coalition troops following 9/11.²⁷ Factional disagreements over the means and pace of achieving those ends are virtually inevitable, as they are among all ideological groupings, perhaps especially among totalitarian ones. Yet such groups have enough organizational and ideological contact based on financial and social networks, and general agreement on comparable ultimate ends, so that they can function as a decentralized yet coherent force that is especially difficult to counter for that very reason. Similarities in strategies and tactics of other totalitarian ideologies therefore become useful for typological comparison. The Leninists, for example, like the extremist Islamists, compare somewhat in their emphasis on a small, conspiratorial elite whose task is to raise the consciousness of inattentive masses and spread their belief system globally and universally.

A comparison with the totalitarian regime *par excellence*, Nazi Germany, may help demonstrate the point more clearly. Most people think of a totalitarian system as a highly unified, monolithic, highly disciplined polity, but that is hardly the case. It is rather the *scope* of the *political*, that is, what areas of life the state, party, or leadership can interfere in, that largely makes a political system totalitarian or not. A totalitarian system, in fact, can be quite decentralized

in many ways. As the late Sir Alan Bullock insightfully noted, what made Nazism and Leninism totalitarian was not that the government could intervene in people's lives *everywhere* — that is impossible. It is that the totalitarian polity can intervene *anywhere* — thereby creating an expectation of interference that does not take day-to-day supervision or complete behavioral control to implement. Setting the strategic goals and inspiring local innovation is enough to create a de facto totalitarian relationship.²⁸

Radical Islamism is somewhat akin to how Ian Kershaw describes the Nazi system (reputedly one of the most centralized regimes in history): Hitler at the center, setting the tone, financing activities, creating the limits (or lack thereof), and the general direction of the movement and government, with thousands of “little Hitlers,” including not only top Nazis but also the *gauleiters* (provincial party leaders) and their staffs chosen from the “old fighters” for their sympathetic brutality and street training in systematic cruelty, and various other thugs filling the middle leadership positions in the bureaucracy. The “little Hitlers” spent their energy “working toward the *Fuehrer*,” that is, anticipating the wishes of the leader from his statements, ideology, and actions, but taking the initiative locally.²⁹

The al-Qa’ida global network is best understood as “little bin Ladens” financed, trained, and guided from “the base,” but planning attacks according to local conditions and capabilities. As bin Laden himself said of the 1998 bombings of two American embassies in Africa: “Our job is to instigate and, by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people responded to this instigation.”³⁰ It is a part of a “think globally, act locally” political grand strategy relying on distinct signals given

from the top. Following a spate of bombings seemingly “instigated” by a public message from al-Qa’ida’s primary ideologist in late 2005, terrorism expert Walid Phares noted: “It’s like the ‘Prime Minister Zawahiri’s’ note comes first, and then the local leader has his note.”³¹

Let us be clear: bin Laden is not Hitler, and al-Qa’ida is not a Great Power. It is not even a state. Yet enough similarities are apparent between their organizational behavior in the pursuit of totalitarian ends, and in the role of how their ideas shape their policies that therefore lead to systemized actions, to warrant useful comparisons for understanding the nature of the movements. And their respective ultimate goals are clearly totalitarian: the political, social, theological, and/or moral exclusion of all other forms of thought in a particular political entity, or even universally, as an ultimate goal. The level of analysis at which that political entity is pursued as an active policy – whether communal, national, regional, or global – is a matter of shifting tactical priorities based on perceptions of immediate political fortunes and levels of resistance that have to be faced. But the goals remain fixed.

Additional organizational similarities exist between the radical Islamists and other totalitarian movements.³² The Islamists, Nazis, and Leninists, for example, share the disdain for, in fact outright opposition to, the separation of public and private lives, a hallmark of liberalism. As Robert Ley, the Nazi director of the German Labor Front, put it with typical cynicism: “The only people who still have a private life in Germany are those who are asleep.”³³ Totalitarians’ respective belief systems are *complete ways of life*, and intrude into every area of human activity, at least in the abstract.³⁴ Islamism is no less encompassing for its adherents. As bin Laden put it bluntly as recently as 2004: “Islam is

one unit that can not be divided,” and “a way of life revealed by God for men to abide by all of its aspects in all their affairs.”³⁵

Radical Islamist theorist the late Syed Abul A’La Mawdudi made a comparison to other totalitarian ideologies even more explicit. Writing of the *sharia*-ruled state, he noted that it:

... cannot restrict the scope of its activities. Its approach is universal and all-embracing . . . (sic) In such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private. Considered from this aspect the Islamic state bears a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and Communist states.³⁶

This is not irrational behavior as some critics of ideology would have it. But it consists of an ends-means analysis carried out within a restricted cognitive framework severely bounded by a system of values, in this case religiously driven.³⁷

Such fixed, totalitarian ends of the Islamists open up the possibility of truly expansive means to pursue them. A fundamental mistake made by those who denigrate ideology and belief systems as useful analytical tools is to view contradictory behavior that is difficult to square with the stated ideals of the ultimate goals of the belief system as evidence that those ideals do not matter, or at least do not matter much. The fanatic always has puzzled the moderate or skeptic, and they are reluctant to believe that the former really exists in a position of power, preferring to see ideology as some sort of ideational gloss used to cover “real” motivations, which are materialistic and interest-based.³⁸

Yet the domestic revolutionary ends of both Nazism and Leninism were implemented incrementally through a series of temporary compromises with political reality, by “revolution by installments” or

revolution by “dosage” respectively.³⁹ As Bullock notes, “Like Hitler, Stalin could afford to be an opportunist because, unlike his opponents, he was clear about his aims.”⁴⁰ Such temporary tactical, expedient behavior does not disprove anything about an ideologist and his ultimate goals. Totalitarianism thus remains a useful analytical tool for understanding the behavior of groups or organizations that adhere to such an ideology or belief system if one assumes that there will be sporadic contradictions between ideas and behavior, as there must be for an ideologist in power (as opposed to sitting on the sidelines.)⁴¹

We often define something partly by what it is not, and this is also true for radical Islamism. There are many other, mainstream Muslim groups—which comprise the majority of the Muslim world—that are more open to the adoption of pluralistic ideals, find a “live-and-let-live” ecumenical ethos congenial politically, and believe Islam to be compatible with these beliefs. This is especially true in Southeast Asian Islam for historical reasons that we need not go into here. As we shall see, this contention between pluralism and totalitarianism is a major source of a long-term identity crisis in the Muslim world that has gathered force once again since the beginning of the latest self-conscious Muslim cultural and political “revival” emerging at least from the 1950s, but more probably from the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.⁴² It is also a basis of the war being waged between the radical Islamists and those Muslims who disagree with them, the “near enemy.”

POLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY

Grand strategy in its most basic form is the overall geostrategic plan that a political entity has in place to protect or pursue its interests and core values, no

matter how they are defined. A *political* grand strategy must include political, economic, social, ideational, and other factors, as all impinge on the political process in some way. More specifically, there are three areas of immediate concern in political grand strategy, in contrast to the normal military formulation of ends-ways-means: *ends*, *means*, and *enemies*. Political enemies are chosen in part because of their capabilities, but it is their ends that are in contradiction that creates the political conflict in the first place. Political grand strategies, then, are at once both abstract templates of ultimate ends and proposed concrete actions to achieve those ends, the latter being the means used in pursuit of the former. They also have much to do with identifying who is the enemy in the sense of those presenting obstacles or threats to the implementation of the political grand strategy.⁴³

Ends and the Battle of Ideas.

The ends of a political grand strategy are the ultimate goals being sought by the political entity, be it an alliance, a state, a party, a political movement, an insurgency, or a terrorist group. The late American strategist, John R. Boyd, argued that the basis for any grand strategy required a political “unifying vision” and historical mission that would cohere all contributory actions into one avowed direction: a set of ultimate political goals in the form of a particular political order. Political grand strategy, as defined here, requires:

A grand ideal, overarching theme, or noble philosophy that represents a coherent paradigm within which individuals as well as societies can shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances—yet offers a way to expose flaws of competing or adversary systems. Such a unifying

vision should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or organic whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things.⁴⁴

Terrorist political visions typically, but not always, contain an idealized version of a “lost paradise,”⁴⁵ an idealized prediction of a brilliant future, or a “found paradise,” and an extremely negative view of the status quo. The unacceptable status quo serves as the main recruitment tool in seeking new adherents and new actions. It remains a truism: one is less likely to act riskily for change if one is satisfied with the way things are.

Such notions may seem vague, and often the ultimate ends sought by political action are rather cloudy and imprecise. What, after all, was “communism” in Marxist theory really supposed to mean? Poetry in the morning and jackhammer in the afternoon, as Marx more or less once put it? It is likely even Marx did not really know. But clearly it was aimed at the eventual “liberation of all mankind,” not a minor task. Or what about the “thousand year Reich” of the Nazis? How could any rational person believe that one could predict history for a thousand years? Yet millions of Germans apparently did in the 1930s. And tens and tens of millions of people died from the pursuit of such illusions.⁴⁶ But rationalism was not a hallmark of the so-called “Third Reich.” One young Nazi explained at the time: “One does not die for a program that one can understand, one dies for a program that one loves.”⁴⁷ Many young totalitarians of other political persuasions could say the same thing. Indeed, as one British Muslim said of the 2005 London bombers, non-Muslims “need to understand, *al-Qa’ida* is inside [in the heart].”⁴⁸

Not only totalitarians reach for the rhetorical stars in animating their followers to pursue grand ultimate goals. President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to give America a new vision of its role in the world with his “New Nationalism.” President Woodrow Wilson wanted to enter World War I, among other reasons, in order to “make the world safe for democracy” by promoting self-determination and republican government. President Franklin Roosevelt told Americans that they were fighting World War II not only in self-defense but in support of the “Four Freedoms.” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill characterized it as a struggle over civilization itself. We have seen that President Kennedy articulated a vision of a world made “safe for diversity.” Shortly after his second inauguration in 2005, President George W. Bush told a news conference, in support of the “Long War” on Terrorism (LWT), that the United States would pursue liberty globally, and that:

Because our own freedom is enhanced by the expansion of freedom in other nations, I set out the long-term goal of ending tyranny in our world. This will require the commitment of generations. But we're seeing much progress in our own time.⁴⁹

Thus, a political grand strategy requires, as a necessary yet insufficient component, an animating, unifying political vision of why action needs to be taken⁵⁰ and sacrifices made, mixed with a belief in the necessity of changing some element—or all elements for totalitarians—of the status quo, that is, the existing political order, domestically and/or internationally.⁵¹ If such a vision cannot be maintained credibly, support for the pursuit of the strategy could dissipate, especially if severe sacrifices are being asked of adherents.

As noted, the animating, unifying vision for the extremist Islamists is a unified Islamic world, under strict *sharia* law, uncorrupted by Western, materialist, or modernist political influences. Such a utopia is often said to have existed in the distant past. Some versions, such as that of “alleged” Jemaah Islamiya leader (he denies he is the leader, or even that there is such an organization), Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, predict that eventually the entire world will *have* to become Islamic, or there can be no peace.⁵² Osama bin Laden has been a little more restrained, but in an open address to the American people, in reply to his self-posed question, “What do we want from you?” answered at the top of the list: “The first thing we are calling you to is Islam.”⁵³ Such exalted ends, ranging from survival to transforming the world, can be used to justify some very nasty means if the political entity is so inclined, as in Bali⁵⁴ or 9/11, especially if it is driven by self-defined desperation.

Ways and Means.

The extremist Islamists utilize a variety of means in pursuit of their goals, ranging from simple proselytization to suicide bombing involving mass murder. A recitation of their variety would serve no purpose here, and is undoubtedly accessible to anyone who has seen the headlines in any country over the last decade or so, and especially since 1988 when extremist Islamist networks rapidly expanded globally. They run the gamut from the very crude, as in the October 2005 Bali bombings, to the sophisticated, as in 9/11 or the Madrid bombings. But it would be a mistake to believe that the sometimes crude technology used demonstrates that the extremist Islamists lack the capacity for

destruction or maintaining global networks. Many of the new Islamists tend to be sophisticated technically and computer savvy, and these means of projecting their message is also very important in their political strategy.⁵⁵ Indeed, many of them are engineers or other technically trained professionals.⁵⁶

The technology issue also affects the "battle of ideas." The ability to communicate instantly and globally is an important means for pursuing the Islamist political grand strategy, and differentiates the new terror from similar past calls for a transnational *ummah*. The technical sophistication of modern Islamists thus separates them from their predecessors. Osama bin Laden publicly has made a similar point himself.⁵⁷ Al-Qa'ida, for example, uses the open sources of the internet for effective and inexpensive intelligence gathering. An extremist Islamist training manual captured in Afghanistan declared that, "Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy."⁵⁸

The spreading means of modern mass communications such as the internet, compact discs, cell phone technology, and satellite television also have expanded the opportunities and processes of recruitment. Thus, the ability to spread the radical Islamist message in the communications age has greatly increased its potential influence. Some analysts have explored the emergence of what could be called a *virtual ummah* with global reach that not only quickens the sharing of information and transcends national borders, but also projects an Islamist civilizational identity that is used for recruitment.⁵⁹ The construction of a web site called "The Voice of the Caliphate" has been completed.⁶⁰ Would-be extremist Islamists can

now swear an actual blood oath to Osama bin Laden online.⁶¹ The Islamists also are becoming more proactive in developing electronic warfare techniques.⁶²

The most interesting and terrifying thing about the means that are allowed in the radical Islamist political grand strategy is that, at least rhetorically, they are only limited by the capabilities that the terrorists possess. In other words, if greater capability of destruction can be acquired, no obvious internal scruples or external moral considerations exist that would prevent them from using them against their enemies. In almost every instance, captured or failed terrorists have proclaimed that the purpose of their terrorist act was to kill as many people as possible.

Ramzi Yousef, for example, one of the masterminds of the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, stated in captivity that he wished to kill tens of thousands of Americans. He was deeply disappointed when “only” six were killed.⁶³ Osama bin Laden has been quoted by a follower as saying that when he obtains nuclear weapons, he will visit a “Hiroshima” on the United States.⁶⁴ The radical Islamists’ demonstrated lack of concern for human life, even Muslim lives, is so extreme it may have begun to cause a backlash among many formerly sympathetic or neutral Muslims.⁶⁵ Even Osama bin Laden’s close friend and brother-in-law, and the man who set up his network of organizations in the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s, Jamal Khalifa, has apparently reached a breaking point, whether for prudential or moral reasons: “Osama is doing these things, which (sic) it’s not logical, not Islamic, and not even strategic. I’m very sorry. I love him. I really love him, but really he is doing very big mistakes (sic). He is really destroying the image of Islam.”⁶⁶

Enemies and Politics.

One of the primary functions of a political grand strategy is to help identify potential or real enemies. This task cannot be accomplished through balance of power analysis alone, as *realpolitik* theories suggest. As has often been noted elsewhere, the United States looks at Israel's possession of nuclear weapons very differently than it would, for example, Iran's. Similarly, during the Cold War the United States did not feel threatened by the French or British nuclear deterrents, but was notably threatened by the Soviet and Chinese nuclear deterrents.

These perceptions have less to do with the possession of nuclear weapons per se than with the perceived intentions and political nature of the nations possessing them. Power analysis is crucial to *prioritizing* enemies, but far less important for defining them in the first place. Defining an enemy is based on three major criteria: 1) a potentially threatening capacity for violent attack; 2) a perception of hostile intentions; and, 3) a ruling ideology that is seen as quite distant and hostile.⁶⁷ The extremist Islamists encompass all three characteristics for the United States, as does the United States for the radical Islamists, even though the civilizational Islamists no longer have a state to call their own with their political expulsion from Sudan and their military defeat in Afghanistan. In recent years, Iran apparently has been trying to fill that void.

Thus the totalitarian nature of the Islamist belief system, and the political grand strategy that follows from it, views all nonbelievers as defined by them as enemies. Like totalitarians before them, they have declared war on most of the world, including, in their case, most of the Muslim world.

RADICAL ISLAMIST POLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY

The Theory: “Near” and “Far” Enemies.

Radical Islamist political grand strategy has evolved over time. In its original manifestation, the reason for the deterioration of the Islamic world was viewed as primarily internal, the “near enemy,” although external, non-Islamic factors, the “far enemy,” obviously played a role. But how indigenous, largely secularist internal forces interacted with those external factors, and insufficiently resisted their influences, was the main cause of their immediate discontent. This was not the least because those internal secularist forces were repressing them politically as obstacles to modernization. The focus of their strategy originally therefore was internal-external (“near”-“far”) rather than external-internal (“far”-“near”).⁶⁸ This was to change over time due to intervening events.

Following World War II, much of the Muslim world was liberated from colonialism as the European empires gradually dissolved. This, of course, led to the question of what was to replace the colonial systems. In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant paradigm was generally a secularist, nationalist path of imitation of Western patterns of societal organization along authoritarian lines, with notable exceptions such as the theocracy in Saudi Arabia. Characteristic leaders of this type were represented by men such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Indonesia’s Sukarno.⁶⁹ Marc Sageman has argued that the humiliating defeat in the 1967 war with Israel discredited the secularist imitative model of development in the minds of many Muslims, especially among the young.⁷⁰ Radical Islamist authors such as Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Hasan

al-Banna (1906-49), Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-79), and Sayyid Qutb (1903-66) became influential with the younger generation of students.⁷¹ The fact that Qutb was tortured and executed by Nasser for his radicalism made him something of a martyr, and discredited the secularists even more in the eyes of many young extremists.⁷²

In a necessarily simplified overview, the Islamist historical argument, steeped in an idealized past, generally goes something like what follows.⁷³ Islam was great in medieval times, but in recent centuries, and especially after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, has fallen on especially hard times. The best way to return to the days of Islamic greatness is to return to the “true” Islam of the earlier period, unsullied by modernism and Western notions of the individual, feminism, and the rule of man-made laws. In this sense, radical Islamism, as defined among these adherents, is opposed rigidly to democracy, socialism, capitalism, equality of the sexes, and, in some cases, nationalism. All of these modernist ideologies are decadent, introduced to the *ummah* by infidels, and aimed at dividing and conquering Islam. Thus, the Islamists see the various competing ideologies of modernity as largely responsible for the decline of Islam relative to other civilizations, especially the West. Since they are radically conspiratorially-minded, they view the promotion in the *ummah* of modern forms of political, economic, and social organization as part of a plot to keep Muslims weak.

The “far enemy,” especially the Western “imperialists,” has taken advantage of the moral disarray of post-colonial Islam, the narrative goes on, and oppressed the Islamic peoples. Since independence following World War II, the “far enemy” has exploited them economically and politically through support for

secularist or apostate modernizing local governments and ideologies in the Muslim world, i.e., the “near enemy,” to keep believers divided and deprived of true Islam, despite nominal independence.⁷⁴ Among such Islamists, including al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiya, even nationalism can be an enemy because it has fractured the *ummah*.⁷⁵ Who, after all, drew most of the modern borders in the Muslim world? The “far enemy” did so. And if you fanatically believe, as many radical Islamists do, that virtually all actions taken by the West are aimed at weakening the Muslim world, this charge makes logical sense. To these militants, pro-nationalist actions by the West and the “near enemy” are still part of a broader conspiracy. Thus modern development and Globalization are not part of the solution for the Muslim world’s suffering to the Islamists, but the crux of the problem. Cheery promises of future material progress through Globalization, even if supported by performance, therefore do not appeal to them. Their hatred of the status quo is far more ideological and theological than material.⁷⁶

Specifically, what we are concerned with here are those groupings of Islamists who are attempting to transform the communal and nationalist identities of Muslim populations, often with objective and understandable communal and national grievances, into those of a transnational, “superordinate” identity⁷⁷ of, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s concept of the nation, a transnational “imagined community” of radical Islamist Muslims.⁷⁸ Anderson argues that such a community is imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁷⁹ The virtual *ummah* of modern communications and the

internet makes the transnational community far easier to imagine and enjoin loyalties.

The new radicals, although varied in a number of ways, shared this vision of the problems facing the Islamic world: the indigenous governments that had replaced colonialism – the “near enemy” – had moved too far away from Islamic norms, were cooperating with and aping the former oppressors – the “far enemy” – while leading the “sedentary”⁸⁰ Muslim masses down the wrong path, and causing a moral crisis in the *ummah* that led to the humiliation of the Islamic peoples. Since the most serious primary problem was internal to the societies involved and morally-based, it affected the entire Muslim world, not merely the Arab world or particular countries.⁸¹ Thus the new radicalism began to emerge as a pan-Islamist and civilizational movement rather than the pan-Arabist or nationalist movements that one tended to see in the first several decades after colonialism ended.

In the abstract, the ideal form of the Islamist political grand strategy could be represented as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Ideal Form of Islamist Political Grand Strategy.

As the political grand strategy emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, the first strategic stage was supposed to consist of conquering the “near enemy” secular or apostate governments in Muslim nations, followed by confrontation of the “far enemy” with a unified *ummah*. The Soviet military presence in the region beginning in 1979 shifted that sequence to fighting the “far” enemy first. The growing American presence after 1991 shifted priorities once more to fighting both the “near” and “far” enemies simultaneously.

Of course, these typologies overlap, and we again are generalizing from some of the plans of the most radical Islamist groups, but these simultaneous conflicts over identity questions represent the ideational template or framework within which the violence of much Islamist terror is being waged. Other non-Muslim civilizations are deemed enemies also, but the West, and especially the United States, being the most powerful and the most involved in supporting secularist and moderate governments in Muslim-dominant countries, is the first among equals among the “infidels.”⁸²

The proposed attacks on the “near enemy” entail fundamental shifts in identity such that it is only partially a strategy of violence. It also entails propaganda, theological confrontation, formal and informal education, and recruitment. Thus, an inner struggle in the Muslim world exists over religious identities and over the role of secularism in that identity. Osama bin Laden’s standard of who is a believer predictably is quite severe: if any Muslim offers even one word in “helping the infidels,” he is deemed a nonbeliever, that is, an infidel himself.⁸³ Other top al-Qa’ida leaders agree on the rigid codes of behavior. To Jordanian terrorist Abbu Masab al-Zarqawi, the late leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, democracy was also the enemy, and

he declared a “bitter war” against it anywhere in the *ummah*. Elections, representative government, and popular sovereignty are the “essence of infidelity and deviation from the true path.” Anyone promoting this “malicious ideology” will be treated as an infidel and dealt a death sentence.⁸⁴

The radical Islamists want to eradicate secularism and modernism from Muslim societies, while maintaining many of the material benefits that appear to be a product of such societies, and they see Muslims who do not agree with this view as heretics and apostates who are part of the problem. Although clear differences with materialist and other religious philosophies exist, Islamism has strong totalitarian roots in its rigid exclusivity toward other systems of thought and a similarly powerful in-group/out-group hatred.⁸⁵

Non-Islamist Muslims of the “near” enemy also can be judged expendable in the struggle for the *ummah*. To the terrorists of Jemaah Islamiya captured in Singapore in 2002, for example, “even Muslims who did not subscribe to militant jihad were seen as infidels.”⁸⁶ Similarly, Zacarias Moussaoui, the French citizen who was the so-called “twentieth hijacker” on 9/11, was cited at his trial as believing that “it was Islamically proper to engage in violent actions against ‘infidels’ (nonbelievers) even if others might be killed by such actions, because if the others [i.e., other believers] were ‘innocent,’ they would go to paradise, and if they were not ‘innocent,’ they deserved to die.”⁸⁷ Thus even “sedentary,” innocent Muslims are expendable in service to the Islamist cause, although they are not targeted specifically.

It should be noted that this particularly radical version of Islamism is not accepted by everyone in

the extremist movement, not even everyone in the al-Qa'ida-affiliated Southeast Asian group, Jemaah Islamiyah. Although it is unclear how deep and wide the divisions are, according to intelligence sources and defectors, some factions in Jemaah Islamiyah are distinctly uncomfortable in killing other Muslims, or even attacking secular governments of the "near enemy." This appears to be for both moral and prudential reasons. The hard liners, on the other hand, apparently see these deaths as necessary collateral damage in their quest for theological purity and civilizational greatness.⁸⁸ Unfortunately, as one might expect, the operational control over terror missions is apparently in the hands of the hard liners.

Faced with this desperate status quo, as they see it, and the frustration of not achieving their long-term vision of the *ummah*, according to the hard line Islamist view, a wholesale Muslim cultural revolution is necessary and can only be attained by the resurgence of "true" Islam, which generally is defined as a form of a radical Wahabbist/Salafist vision of *sharia* law, and the complete rejection of "corrupt" and "damaging" modernizing ideologies, of the West in particular. The means, and the only means, to this end is violent revolution leading to civilizational clashes.

The Multiple Roles of Social Identity in Islamist Political Grand Strategy.

The radical Islamist political grand strategy is based on its desire to reshape the identities of the entire Islamic world. Identities make up a person's very self-perception, and exist at multiple levels. They also can vary greatly in intensity at various levels, and will be invoked in some situations but not in others. Samuel

Huntington explains in further detail, and it is worth quoting him at length:

Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Chinese or Hindu communities. Chinese, Hindus, and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. **A civilization is thus the highest cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.** It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. [Emphasis added.]⁸⁹

Huntington's version of the clash of civilizations has been controversial, yet very influential, both with those who agree with it and those who disagree. The United Nations (UN), for example, as early as 1998 named 2001 the "Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations" in reaction to predictions of cultural clashes.⁹⁰ More recently, at the instigation of Spain, the UN has been called on to create something called the "Alliance of Civilizations" to help prevent such a clash.⁹¹ In France, following the widespread Muslim rioting that afflicted that country in late 2005, President Jacques Chirac declared in January 2006: "In numerous countries, radical ideas are spreading, advocating a confrontation of civilizations."⁹² An anonymous French official averred at the same time, "This is more than a clash of civilizations. It is a cancer within our country that, if unchecked, will destroy all of France."⁹³ In a poll taken

in Germany in May 2006, 61 percent believed that a “clash of cultures” with Islam already had begun.⁹⁴ The scent of civilizational clashes is in the air in the early 21st century.

Yet Huntington’s concept of civilization as the highest rung of the identity ladder is only partially useful in understanding the ultimate goals of the radical Islamists and the place of social identities in their political grand strategy. He importantly leaves out identities of groups that seek global hegemony or universal dominion for their civilizational adherents. He argues that the era of universalizing ideologies is over,⁹⁵ and the demise of the popularity of Leninism and Fascism as “waves of the future” in the late 20th century appears to bear this out. Yet the more visionary versions of an extremist Islamist global *ummah* demonstrate that social identities and the resulting political goals do not always end at the particularistic civilizational level as his theory predicts. Like some ideologies, civilizational identities, especially if tied to one of the world’s universalizing religions such as Islam, will have universalistic aspirations, and sometimes violent ones.

As noted, identities are elastic and malleable concepts. Yet they can become so important to an individual that they dominate his entire view of the world and drive a majority of his actions. Huntington argues that identities essentially are negative: “People define their identity by what they are not.”⁹⁶ But that is too narrow a definition to understand the power that identities can have over people. Identities are both negative (I am American because I am not French) and positive (I am American because I like being American.) As the social psychologists put it, group identity is made up of both the need to be different and the need

to belong.⁹⁷ Each need reinforces the other and can create extreme in-group loyalty that can surpass other identities such as community, family, and the like.

This behavior is not unique to radical Islamists or the easily duped. When Eleanor Philby, wife of the famous English communist spy Kim Philby, asked him who came first, her and the children or the party, Philby, an educated and sophisticated man, replied unhesitatingly, “The Party, of course.”⁹⁸ When one puts in-group loyalty before even immediate family, one’s identity as usually formed in most societies in the world has been transformed radically. It is unlikely that Philby made this transformation simply because he identified as a noncapitalist—he was in love with the Revolution more than his children. This extreme kind of group loyalty, the kind that can lead people to blow themselves up, also must be based on being for something, and intensely so. It is important to understand this mentality in order to understand the threat we face.

Social identity can be usefully separated into five general categories and levels: **communal** (i.e., familial, clan, tribal, and localist), **national**, **regional**, **civilizational**, and, in its most vague manifestation, **global**.⁹⁹ The extremist Islamist political grand strategy in its most radical form seeks to move the entire Muslim world (minus their various excluded “near enemy” members) up the identity ladder, starting from its largely “sedentary” current state, moving to national purification along radically Islamist-defined *sharia* law, norms, and standards (their model appears to the former Taliban government of Afghanistan), then regionally, then to civilizational unity in the Islamist *ummah*, and, in some versions, then to global civilizational hegemony in the entire world.¹⁰⁰

The al-Qa'ida-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines arguably has exhibited this rough pattern of evolution of social identities to the civilizational level. Most of its original members came from the Tausig tribe in Mindanao, and their original armed conflicts with the Filipino government appear to have been largely local and tribal. Infused with new Islamist leadership from returning Jihadists in the late 1980s fresh from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, the group was created formally in 1991 and began a terrorist campaign in favor of nationalistic separatism. Finally, the Abu Sayyaf joined with al-Qa'ida, Jemaah Islamiya, and other Islamist elements to coordinate policies in pursuit of a "super-state" in Southeast Asia comprised of all Muslims in the region that eventually would join with the transnational *ummah*.¹⁰¹ The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), another, larger Filipino separatist terror group, arguably followed a similar path of identity development,¹⁰² although if its peace negotiations with the Filipino government at the time of this writing are in good faith, the group may well have abandoned that path.

Thus, the Abu Sayyaf Group and MILF roughly have followed the desired path mapped out by the extremist Islamist political grand strategy: communal identity, to national identity, to civilizational identity, to regional super state, to, perhaps, global civilizational hegemony, at least as far as their ultimate political goals go. It is a rare, yet striking, limited success story for the extremist Islamist project, and if allowed to succeed in the Philippines, undoubtedly would encourage the group to try elsewhere, as well as giving it a territorial base from which to try.

The radical Islamists certainly have been pursuing such a political strategy. As Pakistan's former prime

minister, Benazir Bhutto, has put it, “[bin Laden] was able to tap different youths in different regions on different issues by pegging it all as a war between Islam and the West, but, in fact, he was [worsening] the regional conflicts for his own agenda, which was to topple important Muslim countries and seize power for himself.”¹⁰³ This is the cynical view of an experienced politician, but it has much truth in it. While correct about the tactics that bin Laden has been utilizing, Bhutto mistakenly sees bin Laden’s goal as merely seeking power for himself. His real end game, as we have seen, is creating a new Muslim transnational political order based on strict *sharia* principles.

RADICAL ISLAMIST MILITARY GRAND STRATEGY

The extremist Islamists have articulated a military grand strategy that is integrated with the means and ends of their political grand strategy. According to a book entitled *The Management of Barbarism*, posted on the internet by an al-Qa’ida organization, its military strategy is planned to advance through three stages.¹⁰⁴ The first is the “Disruption and Exhaustion” phase, which is the period of the present. In this phase, the goals are to: “a) exhaust the enemy’s forces by stretching them through dispersal of targets,” and “b) attract the youth through exemplary targeting such as occurred at Bali, Al-Muhayya and Djerba.”

After Phase One succeeds in clearing a “zone” where the Islamists are in control, the Second Phase, “The Management of Barbarism” will ensue. This second plan apparently was formulated in reaction to the perceived mistakes made by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the wake of the fall of the USSR. It calls for the

rapid establishment of an Islamist order to: "establish internal security, ensure food and medical supplies, defend the zone from external attack, establish Shari'ah (sic) justice, an armed force, an intelligence service, provide economic sufficiency, defend against [public] hypocrisy and deviant opinions and ensure obedience, and the establishment of alliances with neighboring elements that are yet to give total conformity to the Management, and improve management structures." Thus some Islamist ideologists view the record of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as having been in some respects *insufficiently totalitarian* by not setting up *sharia* law and a coercive, totalistic state quickly enough, and they plan to correct that defect in the future. No moral, theological, or social "barbarism" is to be allowed.

Once Phase Two is accomplished, the military grand strategy calls for the extension of the new order in Phase Three through repetition of the phases in an "Empowerment" phase, as a self-expanding politico-military process. Eventually this process will encompass the entire *ummah*, and, as noted in their political grand strategy, they then will be ready to confront other civilizations from a position of strength.¹⁰⁵

Tactically, the strategy uses terrorist attrition to wear down a stronger enemy, attacking soft targets where possible (the book specifically suggests tourist areas as targets), a classic insurgent test-of-wills approach. As Stephen Ulph notes about the Islamist strategy mapped out in the book, "After discussing the necessity of establishing a proper chain of command, in both the doctrinal and military fields, the [Islamist] author outlines important military principles (striking with the heaviest force at the weakest point; a superior enemy is defeated by economic and military attrition)."¹⁰⁶

Bin Laden himself has made clear that he views his activities as an extended war of attrition over generations, as an attempt to wear down the United States through its strategic overextension. He also sees his position as a win-win situation: if the Americans did not react forcefully to 9/11 by invading Afghanistan, for example, they would have been disgraced; if they did invade Afghanistan they would exhaust themselves materially, as had the Soviets. As Abu Bakr Naji notes in the book *The Management of Savagery*, since the United States, like the USSR, is a materialist-based culture, it is inherently weak: “note that the economic weakness from the burdens of war or from aiming blows of vexation (*al-nikaya*) directly toward the economy is the most important element of cultural annihilation since it threatens the opulence and (worldly) pleasures which those societies thirst for.”¹⁰⁷

On a computer hard drive captured in Afghanistan, a letter existed that bin Laden wrote to Afghani leader Mullah Muhammad Omar on the issue of the American response to 9/11 prior to the U.S. invasion of that country:

Keep in mind that America is currently facing two contradictory problems:

a) If it refrains from responding to *jihad* operations, its prestige will collapse, thus forcing it to withdraw its troops abroad and restrict itself to U.S. internal affairs. This will transform it from a major power to a third-rate power, similar to Russia.

b) On the other hand, a campaign against Afghanistan will impose great long-term economic burdens, leading to further economic collapse, which will force America, God willing, to resort to the former Soviet Union's only option: withdrawal from Afghanistan, disintegration, and contraction.¹⁰⁸

The consistent equation of the United States with the former Soviet Union may prove to be one of the Islamists' biggest mistakes. They are not facing a failing state. Yet strategic and economic overextension remains a potential danger that could be exploited by the enemy.

Thus, the Islamist political and military grand strategies are integrated intelligently and systematically in a sophisticated synthesis of distinct political aims and insurgent military traditions, despite the relative novelty and seeming randomness of some of their beastly bombing tactics. This is a highly educated, disciplined, and trained enemy, not merely a group of power-seeking renegade clerics with mere delusions of grandeur as some, such as Benazir Bhutto, portray them.

Explaining Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy in Practice.

As we have seen, the Islamist political grand strategy is, at least in the abstract, a sequential one. In stage one, the "near enemy" secularists and apostates are to be defeated, the "sedentary" Muslims won over, and a unified Islamist civilization created. Then a second stage will commence: a confrontation with the other civilizations around the globe which, in some of the more frantic versions, will end with the triumph of Islam everywhere in the world.

The former Soviet Union threw this sequence off in 1979 by invading Afghanistan and creating the necessity of a defensive *jihad* in that country. This was followed by the largely Western invasion of Iraq in 1991, and the subsequent placing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region as a deterrent

against attack on the Saudis and as part of the sanctions regime against Iraq that followed the war. These events, among others, led to increasing attacks on Western, Eastern, and African interests in the mid-1990s before the *ummah* actually was united, or even close to it.¹⁰⁹ In the short run, these strikes against the powerful won the Islamists admirers in the Muslim world, especially among the young. The Osama bin Laden tee-shirt became ubiquitous in many Muslim countries,¹¹⁰ and even in the West among Muslim immigrants. The radical Islamist strategy shifted gears in the early 1990s and increasingly entailed attacking *both* the “near” and “far” enemies.¹¹¹ As chief al-Qa’ida ideologist Ayman Muhammad al-Zawahiri put it in a post-9/11 book: “. . . we reiterate that focusing on the domestic [i.e., “near”] enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage.”¹¹² Things have not gone according to the extremist Islamist plan, yet they have proved resourceful in adapting to new conditions.

What Is the Appeal?

Why do these radical identity-driven ideas appeal to some in the Muslim world? This is far too complicated a subject to deal with adequately in this monograph, but identity theories can offer analytical starting points that can then be tested against the empirical evidence, such as it is.

It is more likely that such a transformation of group identity is done through the medium of religion than through a secularist ideology.¹¹³ To embittered, powerless people who tend to externalize their own shortcomings and who have a seemingly endless capacity for outrage, revolution and the attainment of the certainty of paradise and God’s favor are powerfully

positive inducements.¹¹⁴ To the young who, as we have seen, are particular targets of Islamist recruiters, the excitement of being part of a conspiratorial movement and belonging to something larger than oneself in fighting a hated enemy also can be a powerful draw. They may be less likely to question the claims of charismatic religious leaders. Selflessness and sacrifice can seem to be especially noble to those young people who see the world as corrupt and unjust.¹¹⁵

Thus statements by bin Laden, who gave up a very privileged life to live in the Sudan and the wilds of Afghanistan, in praise of the 9/11 terrorists, such as "Victory is not material gain; it is about sticking to your principles," can be highly appealing to some idealistic young people.¹¹⁶ "Revolutionary asceticism"¹¹⁷ among leaders, whether real or feigned, constructive or destructive, often has been an additional element of charisma in their appeal, from Moses to Jesus to Buddha to Gandhi to Lenin to Hitler to Ho. The Islamists have used it to good effect in separating themselves politically from what they portray as the typical grubby "near enemy" politician who consorts with the infidels and betrays Islam; that is, a politician who must live and work in the real political world of compromises and the "art of the possible."

Evidence for the Existence of the Strategy.

One must include in an inquiry into the ultimate goals of the radicals' political grand strategy, the question: How do we know that the Islamists seek a clash of civilizations? The simple answer is: because they say so. Such civilizational attitudes are openly and often expressed by global Islamists. It should be again emphasized that it is not being argued here that the

Muslim world views reality this way at this time, but that the radical Islamists *themselves* view it this way. That is, the ultimate goal of the strategy is to create this civilizational clash eventually, although some also say it is already in progress.¹¹⁸

Thus, when asked directly by an interviewer in October 2001 whether the Islamists were involved in a Clash of Civilizations, bin Laden answered in the affirmative:

I say that there is no doubt about this. This [clash of civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven in the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, and any true believer who claims to be faithful shouldn't doubt these truths, no matter what anybody says about them.¹¹⁹

In December 2004, bin Laden called on all Muslims to "Resist the New Rome" and declared that "This conflict and confrontation [with the infidels] will go on because the conflict between right and falsehood will continue until Judgment Day."¹²⁰ This clash of civilizations is not to be limited to the West. In April 2006, bin Laden heavily criticized those Muslims who denied that there was an ongoing clash of civilizations, which included not only the Jewish and Christian "crusaders," but also the "Buddhist pagans."¹²¹ Bin Laden also has talked in terms of the "Hindu enemy" in the past, and has called on Pakistan to prepare enough nuclear weapons to defeat it in Kashmir.¹²² There can be no peace between the true believers and nonbelievers, according to this view.

Osama Bin Laden's counterpart in Southeast Asia, the Emir Abu Bakar Bashir of Jemaah Islamiya, recently agreed in a wide-ranging interview, although he placed the conflict in the future, as in the original strategic sequence:

It is true there will be a clash of civilizations. The argumentation is correct that there will be a clash between Islam and the infidels. There is no [example] of Islam and the infidels, the right and the wrong, living together in peace.¹²³

When all Islam is united into a “truly” transnational *ummah* under *sharia* laws, then the clash of civilizations will, and must, occur. Bashir also has been quoted as teaching, “Allah has divided humanity into two segments, namely the followers of Allah and those who follow Satan. . . . Between [the infidels] and us there will forever be a ravine of hate, and we will be enemies until you follow Allah’s law.”¹²⁴

Al-Qa’ida’s designated leader in Iraq, the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, apparently agreed with Bashir. In a tape released to his radical Islamist sympathizers before he was killed, he made two demands before he would end his terror: 1) remove all non-Muslims from Palestine, Iraq, and any other Islamist-defined Muslim lands; and 2) “install (sic) *sharia* on the entire Earth and spread Islamic justice there. . . . The attacks will not cease until after the victory of Islam and the setting up of *sharia*.”¹²⁵ Clearly this view encompasses the sequential political grand strategy of the Islamists: civilizational unity followed by civilizational hegemony (a universalized global Islamist identity.) This vision may seem excessively grandiose, but it is comparable in scope and ambition to the ultimate aims of the Leninists, for example.

These views are not just held by leaders and regime strategists, but have seeped down to the lower ranks of the radical Islamist movement. When Abdul Hakim Murad, a terrorist compatriot of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, was asked by his Filipino interrogators after his

1995 arrest whether he was attacking the United States because it was making trouble for “your country,” he replied:

I’m not. I’m—look, I’m not looking for a country. I don’t care about [a] country. We are Muslims. The United States is making trouble for Muslims.¹²⁶

Similarly, when captured Singaporean Islamists, coming from a country that is not occupied by foreign troops, where Muslims are in relative terms neither marginalized nor oppressed, and where socio-economic conditions are among the highest in the region, were questioned by psychiatrists, they were found to be spiritually and economically motivated, including concern for helping the broader *ummah*.¹²⁷ National liberation per se did not figure into their most important motivations.

There is even a racist element to this civilizational conflict among some Islamists. When asked why they had killed Australians rather than Americans, one of the 2002 Bali, Indonesia bombers flippantly answered, “Australians, Americans, whatever — they are all white people.”¹²⁸

Radical Islamism and Nationalism: A Critique of the National Liberation Thesis.

These statements, and others like them among captured Islamists, strongly suggest an emerging civilizational identity among young radical Islamists that takes precedence over any particular national identity, although Afghanistan under the Taliban, as the “only” Islamist state in the world and home of al-Qa’ida, was given a special place in their loyalties. Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban, lost that

place and is now again an “infidel” country.¹²⁹ Efforts to appease such convinced civilizational Islamists along nationalistic lines may “succeed” in the short term, but are very likely to fail in the longer term because further demands are inevitable until the ultimate transnational goals are reached. National liberation is only a stepping stone to civilizational and/or global liberation for the radical Islamists, as it was for the Leninists. Islamism ultimately is not about nationalist goals, although they are important in the short term, but about civilizational or global goals.

Thus, the thesis of Robert Pape, who has written a recent influential book claiming that suicide terrorism, though not necessarily other forms, is “primarily nationalistic, not religious,” overlooks the continued importance of religious-based and transnational terrorism when that thesis is applied to radical Islamism more generally.¹³⁰ If one looks at aggregate terrorist incidents, not just suicide terror as U.S. strategists must, including attacks on property and failed attempts without casualties, the picture changes somewhat. According to the State Department’s “Worldwide Incidents Tracking System,” in 2005 there were 5,378 global terrorist incidents, using a far broader classification than suicide bombing alone. Of these, 1,101 were religiously based, 3,298 were secularly (but not necessarily nationalistic) based, and 979 were of unknown origin.¹³¹ While it is true that terrorism remains primarily secular, religious-based terror also remains an important aspect of the problem. Pape’s thesis also has not had much predictive power. Since Pape’s original presentation of the thesis in 2003, suicide terrorism has been “frequently more religiously motivated.”¹³²

Moreover, such violence by al-Qa’ida and its supporting groups can be both nationalistic and

religious, but it is always in service to broader long-term transnational extremist Islamist goals. Pape also claims, “every group mounting a suicide campaign over the past 2 decades has had as a major objective—or as its central objective—coercing a foreign state that has military forces in what terrorists see as their homeland to take those forces out.”¹³³ While this claim may have some surface plausibility, when applied to the real world as policy analysis, it loses much of its analytical value. This is especially true if you include Southeast Asia and other parts of the *ummah* outside of the Middle East, something Pape only partially attempts.

As Pape’s analysis makes note, suicide bombing from 1980 to 2001 comprised only 3 percent of overall terrorist attacks, although it can claim an inordinate percentage of the casualties (48 percent; this figure excludes 9/11 to prevent skewing the results).¹³⁴ Casualties are an important, but hardly the only, measure for defining the threat of terrorism. And a general counterterrorism strategy should not be based on a relatively small portion of the overall capabilities and aims of the terrorists. Some of the latest evidence at the time of this writing, including the strategy of Naji quoted above, suggests that the Islamists are switching somewhat to economic targets in a “bleed-until-bankruptcy” long-term strategy, which is unlikely to entail suicide bombings.¹³⁵ Suicide bombings are thus but a small part of the overall terrorist threat.

In Southeast Asia specifically, a region in which Pape ignores examples crucial to the study of terrorism,¹³⁶ this analysis does not seem to apply, given the relative rarity of suicide bombings there. But even if we look at his analysis within the context of suicide bombings in the region, it does not explain the Indonesian Bali

suicide bombings by Jemaah Islamiya – a transnational, not merely national group – which were aimed at the tourist industry and the “near enemy” of the Indonesian government as much as the “far enemy” of Australia.¹³⁷ Nor does it explain some of the other suicide terror bombings in Indonesia, which were along sectarian religious lines, not nationalistic ones. There are no foreign troops occupying Indonesia, and there have not been any since the early 1950s when the Dutch left. Pape’s theory also apparently does not explain the radical Islamist suicide bombings that began to escalate in Bangladesh in late 2005. These attacks were aimed at a secularist government in an Islamic country that does not have any foreign troops stationed in it, or any important contested territorial claims. The suicide bombing campaign began after local Islamic militants connected with radical Islamist transnational ones.¹³⁸

More importantly, the suicide terrorism-as-national-liberation thesis ignores the entire ideological framework of the Islamist political grand strategy. What the radical Islamists want to do is rid the Muslim world of any foreign *presence* or *influence* – commercial, cultural, political, social, ideological, ideational – not merely military occupation or strategic cooperation with the “near enemy.” As we have seen, they have made this repeatedly evident. Thus removing troops and moving to an “offshore” military strategy will not solve the problem.

If we do not understand this, we cannot understand their values-based frames of reference from which their actions flow.¹³⁹ *Realpolitik* analysis may tell us something about the Islamist military or political tactics, but precious little about their grand military and political strategies, which are far more ambitious in purging non-Islamist influences as an absolute

value. An understanding of those strategies is much more useful for explaining how Islamists choose and prioritize their enemies, and in demonstrating their much larger strategic ambitions. In this instance, ideational analysis trumps materialist analysis, although both are necessary to explain radical Islamist behavior.

Once again, ideational elective affinities with Leninism as a kindred totalitarian ideology can be instructive in understanding the politics of Islamism on the nationalism issue. In some fundamental ways, this political grand strategy resembles that of Leninism after 1917, and perhaps other totalitarian ideologies at other times. Leninists were in favor of “national liberation” from Western (i.e., in their case non-Leninist) influence (as are the radical Islamists), but only as a first stage that would then free the new Leninist states, with all alternative belief systems completely purged, to join in the larger community of socialist states that would then disappear into a unified global community. Eventually, all alternative ways of thinking would disappear, including the nationalist one. This appears to be the same sequential strategy that the most radical Islamists, the ones most responsible for terrorism, also adopt but for ideational not materialist reasons.

There are, of course, as many differences between Leninist materialism and Islamist spiritualism as there are similarities. Yet in terms of basic political grand strategies, especially the tactical use of nationalism as a first stage to set up a larger, transnational community, distinct similarities exist. To stop at the nationalist identity as a frame of reference is to miss the point of radical Islamist ideology.

Why Do They Hate Us?

Although the entire non-Muslim world makes up the “far enemy,” the primary target of this grand strategy with the collapse of the Soviet Union ultimately became the United States, “the head of global unbelief”¹⁴⁰ as bin Laden calls it. The United States is also identified by the radical Islamists and others as the leader of the post-Cold War spread of Neoliberal economic and political values, which they loathe, under the concept of Globalization. The introduction or spread of such values and practices into agrarian or partially industrialized societies can seriously challenge traditional societal relationships. Traditional and modern societies are relatively stable. But the actual movement from the former to the latter is often profoundly destabilizing and disruptive.¹⁴¹ It was so for Western societies which had decades and sometimes centuries to adjust. It is even more so for the traditional societies of the non-Western world which are undergoing these changes at an unprecedented rate of speed. These transnational forces, especially the economic ones, have not left the Muslim world untouched.

Since Neoliberalism emphasizes limited government to help maintain global economic competitiveness, social safety nets sometimes have proved inadequate in sheltering the lowest socio-economic classes, or particular sectors of the economy such as farming.¹⁴² This has placed new challenges on the national legitimacy of some governments, rather than the predicted alleviation of ethnic conflict and increased legitimacy associated with Neoliberal modernization theory.¹⁴³ This has not only meant further economic marginalization of already alienated groups, but has created what could be called a value vacuum. As

Turkish scholar Michael Mousseau notes generally of the effects of the intrusion of Globalized markets in traditionalist rural areas: "A society with clientalist values and beliefs but with fading protections from [communal identity] in-groups is extremely vulnerable to any in-group system that promises to put an end to its deep sense of insecurity."¹⁴⁴ The Islamists are trying to exploit those endemic communal insecurities in national, regional, and civilizational terms. Not too much should be made of this in the long run, as the effects of Globalization (e.g., foreign direct investment and joint ventures) are associated statistically with a *lessening* of terrorist activity.¹⁴⁵ But they may give the terrorists a short-term advantage as change is often materially and psychologically disruptive.

There were factors at play in Muslim anger at America other than contrasting ideologies or its symbolic importance as the leader of Globalization, of course, including specific U.S. foreign policies, which led it to emerge as the first among peers among the "far enemies" to the militants. American support of Israel, the invasion of Iraq to expel it from Kuwait in the First Gulf War in 1991, the subsequent sanctions regime against Iraq (which Islamists were as angry over as the 2003 invasion—the sanctions regime against Iraq was no more acceptable to them),¹⁴⁶ the placing of U.S. troops in the sacred land of Saudi Arabia, the abandonment of Afghanistan to the militants in the early 1990s following the defeat of the Soviets, American support for the secularist "near enemy" governments in the Middle East and in South and Southeast Asia, and America's image as the secularist leader of the Neoliberal order emerging from the Cold War, all made it virtually inevitable that those who believed as the militants do would see the United States as the main obstacle to

creating a global Muslim community, and the premier corruptor of the “near enemy.”

When President Bush, Prime Minister John Howard, and Prime Minister Tony Blair declare that the Islamists hate the West for its values, they are right. But that is not the only reason they attack Western interests. They attack them, and will continue to do so as long as they exist, because of the corrupting influence the West represents in the “near enemy” and therefore in keeping the Muslim world divided, in their view.

The Gradual Erosion of the American Deterrent Globally.

The supportive policies of the United States for the governments in the Muslim world, Israel, or the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were not all that convinced the Islamists to bring the war to the “far enemy.” A growing contempt for American power also was entailed. Although many American academics insist that the loss in Vietnam did little harm to America’s reputation as a superpower, the results of that disaster are still with us. In addition, several precipitous subsequent withdrawals in various “hot spots” and the lack of coordinated responses to terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s apparently convinced the Islamists that the United States was vulnerable, in Maoist language, a “paper tiger.”

Bin Laden made this clear when he taunted the Americans in a 1996 document addressed to then-Secretary of Defense William Perry:

Where was this courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took place in 1983 . . . (sic) You were transformed into scattered bits and pieces at that time; 241 soldiers were killed, most of them Marines. And where was this courage of yours when two explosions made you leave

Aden in less than 24 hours! . . . (sic) [Y]ou moved tens of thousands of international forces, including 28,000 American soldiers, into Somalia. However, when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu, you left the area in disappointment, humiliation, and defeat, your dead with you. . . . It was a pleasure for the heart of every Muslim and a remedy to the chests of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut, Aden, and Mogadishu.¹⁴⁷

Bin Laden also predictably refers to the American withdrawal from Vietnam in his litany of “retreats.”¹⁴⁸ This view of the political will of the United States, and the West in general, virtually invites the “Disruption and Exhaustion” and test of wills tactics noted earlier in radical Islamist political and military strategies. Prior to the 2003 Gulf War, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein held remarkably similar views.¹⁴⁹ In spite of academic skepticism, reputations matter greatly in international politics.¹⁵⁰

It does not take too much imagination to predict how the extremist Islamists would interpret a precipitous American withdrawal from either Afghanistan or Iraq in the current period. Al-Qa’ida’s chief ideologist, the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, recently has stated that a victory for the Islamists in Iraq would lead to the immediate expansion of its operations transnationally into Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt.¹⁵¹ So much for the “national liberation from occupied territory” hypothesis, at least according to Islamist leaders’ declared policy plans. Claims that “fewer and fewer” people would pay attention to bin Laden’s claims of “appeasement” with an American military withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula are hardly reassuring given this history.¹⁵² Some anti-Iraqi war critics actually have used the withdrawals in

Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993, those that bin Laden himself uses to ridicule American resolve, as models for altering current policies in Iraq.¹⁵³

This new militancy especially became apparent after the American role in the 1991 Gulf War and the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia. As we have seen, the Islamists could no longer wait until the “near enemy” was defeated and the radical Islamist *ummah* created. The “far enemy” had to be attacked simultaneously in defense of the Islamic world. For this reason, according to former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the removal of American troops from Saudi Arabia was “huge” in making the decision to invade Iraq in 2003:

[U.S. troop] presence there over the last twelve years has been a source of enormous difficulty for a friendly government. It's been a huge recruiting device for al-Qa'ida. In fact if you look at bin Laden, one of his principal grievances has been the presence of crusader forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina.¹⁵⁴

Removing U.S. forces in Arabia by placing them elsewhere in the *ummah*, of course, will not work in appeasing the ire of al-Qa'ida. Only an entire withdrawal of all “infidel” *influence* from the entire Muslim world could accomplish that, and even then there would be historical bitterness mixed with Islamist triumphalism with which to deal. Thus far, bin Laden, *et. al.*, do not seem to have added the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia publicly to their list of American “retreats.”

When mixed with the heady experience of “causing” the collapse of the hated atheistic Soviet superpower by defeating it in Afghanistan, this perception of weak American political will led to certain delusions

of grandeur among many in the Islamist movement. Bin Laden was quoted as saying, "Having borne arms against the Russians in Afghanistan, we think our battle with America will be easy in comparison."¹⁵⁵ Thus began the attacks on the United States and its interests throughout the 1990s and after, to take advantage of its supposed weakness. It remains to be seen if this strategy works.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The categorical imperative of American political grand strategy in the LWT must be: **The conflict with the radical Islamists cannot be allowed to reach civilizational proportions generally, and all other policies must be aimed at this fundamental goal.** If it is allowed to become so, a significant portion of the world's population will be perpetually at war with us, threatening lives and liberties both in the United States and abroad. The LWT therefore involves threats to our core values at multiple and complex levels that are not fixable by going after our enemies militarily, and certainly not by trying to appease them. The war must be fought "indirectly" as well in the realms of economics, ideology, value pluralism, and social justice.¹⁵⁶ We must reward moderation and punish extremism. There are those that argue that any civilizational dialogue must be carried out at the civic societal, not governmental, level, that is, from the bottom up.¹⁵⁷ There may be a good deal of merit in that idea. Certainly a great deal of suspicion of government-to-government programs exists in many Muslim-majority nations. As noted above, a recent quantitative study suggests that Western economic relations in the Muslim areas are correlated with a *reduction* in terrorist activity, raising questions

about the assumption that economic Globalization measures feed the monster. On the other hand, a perception of military dependence on an outside Great Power correlates with *increases* in terrorist activities.¹⁵⁸ Thus the American military “footprint” should be kept to an absolute minimum. Yet there are also proactive programs that governments can implement to support those other efforts.

Social Identity Outreach Programs.

The underlying argument of this monograph is that mainstream Muslims around the world are in danger of becoming the victims of collective identity theft. If this identity theft is to be prevented, supporting moderate alternatives to Islamism will be crucial in the war of ideas so crucial to the LWT. This is a most sensitive subject for obvious reasons. An obvious or discovered covert operation in this area would be disastrous and destroy much of the good work that has been accomplished already. Support for mainstream clerics and governments in the public sphere could include the following: speaking tours for mainstream clerics in the United States; promoting communications between mainstream American Muslim associations and the moderates elsewhere; scholarships for Muslim students at universities in the United States where their sensibilities will be respected; more training for foreign security forces inside the United States; and any other public actions that will not so identify mainstream Muslims with the United States that it will undermine their credibility and legitimacy. To the extent that we can, the goal should be to enhance that credibility and legitimacy, especially in the relatively new democracies such as Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, and

elsewhere. Our support for fledgling democracies must be unswerving and generous.

American outreach programs have been criticized justifiably as being out of touch with the cultures and sensibilities of the target audiences.¹⁵⁹ They have tended to concentrate on short-term programs to convince foreigners that Muslims are treated fairly in the United States or what are seen, often from an ethnocentric point of view, as some of the more positive aspects of American life. These can be fixed by more culturally informed policies, and may be necessary to offset radical Islamist propaganda. But they are in no way sufficient to win the war of ideas. This task is severely complicated by the negative treatments of American values and alleged social realities in Hollywood movies, rap music, and the like, that are very popular overseas in some circles and detested in others. A wholesale program of informational outreach is needed, including in American Muslim communities, to combat the outrageous lies that continue to proliferate, even in countries with free media and relatively high degrees of education as in Europe. As in the Cold War, we must make compellingly clear, at home and abroad, the valuational contrast between ourselves and our enemy, between freedom and oppression.¹⁶⁰ But we also must be willing to accept that other values, such as economic justice, equality, and mutual respect, for example, also must be part of the effort to convince our allies that liberal pluralism is the best way to approach those goals. It is likely that much of the non-Western world, if it democratizes, will lean towards forms of European-style social democracy rather than the liberal democracy favored in the United States. Whether the rest of the world likes us or copies us is not as important as ensuring they know the potential consequences involved in the Islamists winning the LWT.

Yet one must be cautious and do one's homework before following such an "attraction" strategy. In Britain, for example, the government sponsored a tour of "moderate" Islamic clerics around the United Kingdom, but it turned out that many of them had radical backgrounds and ended up preaching militant policies.¹⁶¹ The choices of who should participate should be left to the indigenous governments who are familiar with the cultural terrain, even though in this instance the British government apparently was not. Our goal must be to support the indigenous forces of relative moderation where they exist, *not* try to intervene directly ourselves.

Although warriors and hard-bitten diplomats sometimes disparage the "softer" aspects of a strategic relationship, such as perceptions of mutual respect, cultural sensitivities, and the like, they can be very important in relations with less-developed nations still smarting culturally over the humiliation and exploitation of historical imperialism. They cost us virtually nothing. An example of this can be seen in the Bush administration's new sensitivity to Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation in the world, which has had a very positive effect on relations, both governmental and in civic society. For example, the recent initiatives emanating from Washington toward Indonesia brought this response from Din Syamsuddin, chairman of *Muhammadiyah*, Indonesia's second largest mainstream Muslim organization:

The main cause of this poor relationship is because the West connects Islam to terrorism. But my feeling is that the relationship is beginning to change in Indonesia. This might be in part because the U.S. foreign policy toward Indonesia recently has been to look at Indonesia, being a large Muslim country, as a friend and strategic partner instead of an enemy and a threat. It is changing

now because there is a lot of cooperation between many U.S. agencies with Muslim organizations, like my organization, in Indonesia. We have been working together. We are now engaged in a partnership.¹⁶²

This positive direction has recently been funneled into a more difficult political context given the events in the Middle East in mid-2006. But the potentialities, at least in some Muslim societies, may reappear in the future.

Promote “Dual Identities” and “Attraction/Attrition” Strategies.

The United States should promote a moderate nationalism to combat the ideational appeal of radical transnational Islamism. Policies such as the “dual identity” approach — part national, part communal¹⁶³ — of the current Indonesian and Filipino governments toward Muslim separatist movements appear to be working at the time of this writing in making civilizational solutions less appealing.¹⁶⁴ The relatively singular nationalist approach of the government of Thailand appears to be in trouble at the time of this writing.¹⁶⁵ Yet seeking “dual identity” solutions, what one scholar calls *ethnofederalism*, is also a risky policy for the governments involved, and for the United States. More cultural and political autonomy conceivably might *increase* separatist sentiments and violence in the longer run, thereby creating potential opportunities for the extremist Islamists.¹⁶⁶ That is why governments often are reluctant to implement them. But the use of “search and destroy” military-style “attrition” strategies alone over decades has not worked in any of these countries, has led to many deaths on both sides, complicating attempts at unity, and already has led to increased political opportunities for the Islamists.

This appears to be the pattern in Thailand today. The combined *attraction/attrition* strategies inherent in the “dual identity” approach have done much better at stabilizing the situations, at least in the short run.

The “dual identity,” *ethnofederalist* approach is an attempt to fuse communal and national identities, rather than placing them in direct conflict and causing the rejection of the national communities’ norms and standards of citizenship by fanning in-group hatred. In other words, a nationalist Muslim is assumed to be less likely to become a separatist or civilizational Muslim if equal political loyalty is to country as much as to clan or global *ummah*, or at least that is the hope. And civilizational Islamism, rather than Islamic nationalism, poses the greater threat to American interests. The radical Islamists detest such a notion as “dual identity.” Indeed, the influential Islamist theoretician, Sayyid Qutb, called such diversity of loyalties “hideously schizophrenic” in the 1950s.¹⁶⁷ His radical disciples of today have shown similar contempt for multiculturalism. They desire, instead, a rigid, totalitarian uniculturalism.

Following policies meant to encourage primary identities to remain at the localist or communal level might also be an option, but it also is filled with difficulties and risks. First, it risks hindering economic growth and development. Second, it will probably be seen by nationalist elites, in former colonial countries especially, as attempts to hold back their societies. It conceivably could cause them to drift toward the radical Islamists. Third, it is doubtful that such a policy would hold the support of the American public over time. Nonetheless, there may be cases in which there is no national identity that can readily be appealed to, for example in “failing states.” In a “failing state,”

no central governance exists, and communal and localist identities tend to predominate, with national identities contested or rejected. In such cases, perhaps the least poor solution might be to support subnational communal groups in order to achieve the short-term security goal of preventing a state supporting terrorism from forming, as occurred recently in Somalia.¹⁶⁸ There is, of course, no guarantee that it will work in any case, as there is none for the other levels of identity.¹⁶⁹ Thus a subnational social identity may be the only solution available in certain cases, but it is a short-term policy at best.

Similarly, attempting to manipulate the intra-Muslim identity along Shia and Sunni fault lines is unambiguously risky and might actually have the effect of unifying the two against the non-Muslim world. It is interesting to note that al-Qa'ida virtually ignored using the terms Shia and Sunni in its pronouncements prior to their attempt to instigate a sectarian war in Iraq in 2005. The doctrinal emphasis prior to that time was on Muslim unity across sectarian lines. With the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Qa'ida leader in Iraq, who apparently successfully helped instigate such a sectarian conflict in that country, the overall sectarian appeals have again become somewhat obtuse. Yet these deep religious identity splits in Islam are too volatile and unpredictable to warrant an attempt to use them for political purposes. Neither the West, nor perhaps anyone else, has the knowledge, prestige, and intelligence to carry out such a plan of manipulation.¹⁷⁰

The promotion of "dual-identity" nationalism, or ethnofederalism, is a risky policy, but allowing a drift towards pan-Islamist extremism arguably is far riskier. The United States therefore should subtly encourage

moderate nationalist identities in the Muslim world, even if at some cost to its own short-term interests. We are strong and wealthy enough to do so. If identities can be maintained at the national level, eschewing civilizational warfare, the chances of gradually integrating these nations into the global economy to eliminate some of the underlying causes of their discontent should improve.

The United States, for all of its faults and foibles, also brings much to the table in its attempted creation of a new world order based on liberal institutions, domestically and internationally. The Islamists and their movement oppose such developments, not only in the realm of ideas, but also in the world of global power. Liberalism, in the sense of liberal, market-oriented, democratic, and republican ideas, stands in inherent ideational opposition to this movement. The radical Islamists see such opposition in civilizational identity terms. They base their political grand strategy on this basic set of beliefs. As totalitarians, they cannot accept the value pluralism of the polytheistic, liberal, or secular humanist ideals. There is nothing to negotiate with these people except our own surrender of values, for it would take that to satisfy them. Each concession to them will only lead to more demands until their ultimate goal is achieved. As American negotiators used to complain about the former Soviet Union: "What's theirs is theirs; what's ours is negotiable." It is always thus with totalitarians. Those who counsel otherwise do not understand properly the dynamics of totalitarian social and political movements and the belief systems upon which they are based.

ENDNOTES

1. Kennedy quote from Kennedy Library Online, "Speeches: 'Commencement Address at American University'," June 10, 1963, available at www.jfklibrary.org, October 10, 2006.

2. I am using the term "liberal" here and throughout in the generic sense used in political theory, that is, a belief system that is characterized by an adherence to promoting a host of particular freedoms and political and economic institutions. The political system thus produced may be liberal democratic, social democratic, Christian democratic, or take other forms, but they all adhere to essential liberal values (guaranteed personal freedoms, rule of law, freedom of association, market-oriented economic system, etc.). In the United States, for example, both what are called "Liberals" and "Conservatives" are liberals as the term is used here. They are simply left-wing liberals versus right-wing liberals, respectively. Both "Liberals" and "Conservatives" in the United States and elsewhere have shown themselves capable of quite naïve assumptions in dealing with totalitarians at times. See Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4, October 1989, pp. 937-963. For a good overview of the failures of both left and right liberals in Britain to understand the true nature of Hitlerism despite widespread revulsion toward much of his behavior, see Ian Kershaw, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry, the Nazis, and the Road to War*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2004, pp. 25-64. One of the main problems, argues Kershaw, at least with the London *Times*' analysis, was that: "No connection was made between Hitler's domestic brutality and disregard for legal constraints and his likely actions in the realm of foreign policy." *Ibid.*, p. 33. There were, of course, some who got it right also.

3. See "Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism," Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), September 2005. On the coinage of the word Islamism to distinguish the terrorists from mainstream and moderate Islam, see Norvell B. De Atkine, "Islam, Islamism, and Terrorism," *Army*, Vol. 56, No. 1, January 2006, p. 55. There is no generally accepted definition of the word terrorism. Following the definition used by Rex Hudson in a study for the Library of

Congress, terrorism for the purposes of this monograph is “the calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against noncombatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a subnational group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.” Rex A. Hudson, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1999, pp. 10-11, at www.fas.org/irp/threat/frd.html; available August 23, 2005. I also include attacks against economic targets as terrorism, since they often have great human costs.

4. As viewed speaking in Washington, DC, on C-span, broadcast on October 24, 2005.

5. Alexander Downer, “Extremist Islam Holds Little Appeal,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall 2005, p. 67.

6. For an argument that virtually only ideas matter and that the use of police and military force merely creates sympathy for the Islamists, see Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Mahathir Administration’s War Against Islamic Militancy: Operational and Ideological Challenges,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 2, June 2004, pp. 241-256. Although Liow’s point of the danger of excessive reliance on force alone is well taken, I believe his approach basically is wrong. In my view, the judicious use of force and credible ideational competition are both necessary to combat radical Islamism.

7. For an excellent overview of radical Islamist ideology, see Mary Habeck, *Knowing The Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. See also Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al-Qai’da: Global Network of Terror*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002; Christopher M. Blanchard, *al-Qai’da: Statements and Evolving Ideology*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, February 4, 2005; Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al-Qa’ida’s Leader*, New York: Free Press, 2006; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam:*

The Search for a New Ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

8. For variations among radical Islamist groups, see Gunaratna, pp. 92-94.

9. An experienced psychiatrist, Jerrold M. Post, notes the extreme difficulty in dissuading a confirmed terrorist into abandoning his ways, in "When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-Cultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 26, No. 4, August 2005, pp. 615-636. On regeneration, see also *idem.*, "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, pp. 25-40; Kumar Ramakrishna, "'Constructing' the Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry," *Working Paper No. 71*, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2004, pp. 2-3.

10. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-logic," p. 38.

11. Blanchard, pp. 8-10.

12. For an excellent introduction to the evolution of Jemaah Islamiya, see Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiya: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005.

13. See the August 2005 interview with Bashir, the "Imam" of Jemaah Islamiya, by Dr. Scott Atran in *Spotlight on Terror*, Vol. 3, No. 9, Jamestown Foundation, September 15, 2005, n.p., www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/362baasyir; available September 30, 2005. I want to thank Sherifa Zuhur for alerting me to this source. For the operational planning for the regional "super state," see Captain Wayne Turnbull, "A Tangled Web of Southeast Asian Islamic Terrorism: The Jemaah Islamiya Terrorist Network," Monterey, CA: M.A. Thesis, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2003; Zachary Abuza shows that the extremist Islamic schools in Southeast Asia increasingly have become radicalized into pan-Islamism with contact and influence from the Middle East, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2003, pp. 13-18. The name of the Indonesian-based Islamist group, Jemaah Islamiya, is rendered in several ways. I have maintained the spelling of the author cited in the footnotes, and in the text used the spelling noted here.

14. *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 9.

15. For an example of such reasoning concerning the current radical government in Iran, see David Ignatius, "It's Time to Engage With Iran," *Washington Post Online*, May 26, 2006, n.p., www.washingtonpost.com; available May 26, 2006. After asserting that East-West dialogue ended the Cold War, a simplistic and dubious claim in my opinion, Ignatius argues that the harsh rhetoric of the Iranian regime and its threats to destroy Israel actually are meant to establish domestic credibility so that it can engage the West in peaceful dialogue. Subsequent behavior by the Iranian regime has not supported such a conclusion. For a particularly egregious attempt to portray the radical Islamist President Ahmadinejad of Iran as a moderate, for example, see Michael Slackman, "Iran Chief Eclipses Power of Clerics," *New York Times Online*, May 28, 2006, n.p., www.nytimes.com; available May 28, 2006.

16. James S. Robbins, "Khomeini Redux: Tehran Rising," *National Review Online*, January 3, 2006, www.nationalreview.com; available January 3, 2006. For an extended left-of-center critique of liberal assumptions of reasonableness in totalitarian adversaries, see Martin Bright, *When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: The British State's Flirtation with Radical Islamism*, London: Policy Exchange, 2006, www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/libimages/176.pdf; available April 6, 2006.

17. This valuational mirror-imaging is not only true of those who are naïve or inexperienced in the world of diplomacy. Thus previous foreign secretary of Great Britain and Labour leader Arthur Henderson, after a meeting with Hitler early in his regime, told the *Manchester Guardian* that "He had seen Hitler and believed him to be sincerely pacific." Why? Because Hitler had told him so. Kershaw, p. 34.

18. Gunaratna, pp. 229-230.

19. Mahammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Non-Linearity of Engagement: Transnational Armed Groups, International Law, and the Conflict Between al-Qa'ida and the United States*, Cambridge, MA: Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, 2005, p. iii. Based on this judgment, in a widely distributed article, Mohamedou called for negotiations to end the conflict with al-Qa'ida by essentially ending the American presence in the Middle East, which is one of al-Qa'ida's basic demands for peace. He does not mention South or Southeast Asia. He is apparently unaware that they figure into radical Islamist strategy also. See *idem.*, "Time to Talk to

al-Qai'da?" *Boston Globe Online*, September 14, 2005, n.p., www.boston.com; available September 14, 2005. A visit to this program's web site shows that it is funded largely by the Swiss, Norwegian, Canadian, and Swedish governments, all of which have taken strong positions against major aspects of the American-led LWT. Among the program's "partner organizations" listed are The Center for Human Rights Studies and the Graduate Center for the Study of International Relations of the University of Tehran. Why anti-LWT governments would be financing "partners" that are connected to the University of Tehran, and why they are given space and succor by Harvard's Program for Public Health, will be left to the reader to discern.

20. Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, New York: Random House, 2005. This thesis will be discussed further below.

21. Joseph J. Ellis, "Finding A Place for 9/11 in American History," *New York Times Online*, January 28, 2006, www.nytimes.com; available January 28, 2006. Professor Ellis has had a controversial career, despite the many honors he has received. In 2001 he was suspended for a year without pay from Mt. Holyoke College and forced to give up his endowed chair for lying about his military service. Ellis used his claim to have been a highly decorated Vietnam veteran to support his antiwar activities in the 1980s and 1990s. It was later discovered that he had never been in Vietnam and had spent his army duty teaching history at West Point.

22. John Mueller, "Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?" *Foreign Affairs Online*, September/October 2006, n.p., www.foreignaffairs.org; available September 3, 2006. Mueller does not argue that there is no threat, but that it has been greatly exaggerated.

23. Habeck, pp. 68, 69.

24. Bergen, p. 392.

25. The term "totalitarianism" was coined by Italian journalists in 1923 to describe changes in election laws made by Benito Mussolini that effectively destroyed the chances of other parties to compete in an election. It was later positively appropriated by Mussolini himself. It also was later applied to Nazism and Leninism in the sense of their being ideologies that demanded a monopoly on valuational and political power, refused the legitimate existence of alternative moral value systems, and

attempted to erase the distinction between public and private behavior as objects of political control. That is, they aimed at total control of behavior. It has been, at times, a contested term. I am using it in the generic sense cited here: a belief system that is ultimately intolerant of the existence of any other belief system. For excellent overviews of the concept and its uses in political discourse, see Abbot Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995; and Michael Halberstam, *Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. For Mussolini's adoption of the term in the Italian context, see R. J. B. Bosworth, *Mussolini*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 194-216.

26. For example, see Marc Sageman's use of "hubs" and "nodes" to describe the Islamist networks, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 164; see also Gunaratna, pp. 223-225; Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 6, 8-9, 25, 89, 128-131; and the sources they cite.

27. See Sherifa Zuhur, *A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005.

28. Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991, p. 642.

29. See Kershaw's magisterial two volume biography, *Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1999; and *Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001, for the concept of "working toward the Fuehrer." For a brief overview of the concept, see *idem.*, *The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 83-104.

30. From a December 1998 interview of bin Laden in *Time* Magazine as quoted on a transcript of the PBS series *Frontline*, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts/html; available November 3, 2005.

31. For the "think globally, act locally" formulation and the Phares quote, see Priya Abraham, "Terror: al-Qai'da Affiliates Attack," *World Magazine*, Vol. 21, No. 1, December 31, 2005, n.p., www.worldmag.com; available January 25, 2006.

32. For similarities and differences between totalitarian ideologies and Islamism, see Michael Whine, "Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 2001,

pp. 54-72. For excellent comparisons of totalitarian regimes in Great Powers, see Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin*, and Richard Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2004.

33. Quoted in Adam LeBor and Roger Boyes, *Seduced by Hitler: The Choices of a Nation and the Ethics of Survival*, New York: Barnes and Noble, 2000, p. 22.

34. Paul Berman attributes the totalistic nature of Islamist thought to the interpretation of radical Islam offered by writers such as the influential Egyptian Islamic scholar, Sayyid Qutb. Qutb apparently thought that this totality of claims on one's being was especially Islamic, but, as Berman notes, secular totalitarian ideologies in the West made similar claims on the individual. Berman, pp. 66-67.

35. Quoted in Blanchard, p. 6, fn. 20.

36. As quoted in John C. Zimmerman, "Roots of Conflict: The Islamist Critique of Western Values," *The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 2005, pp. 440-441.

37. For the concept of rational choices made through a fundamentalist religious cognitive and cultural framework, see Kristen Renwick Monroe and Lina Haddad Kreidie, "The Perspective of Islamic Fundamentalists and the Limits of Rational Choice Theory," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 19-43.

38. For this criticism of those who ignore the importance of beliefs and values in international politics, see Douglas J. Macdonald, "Formal Ideology and the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis," in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 80-105.

39. Bullock, p. 446.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 464.

41. Martin Seliger, *Ideology and Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1976; and Macdonald, *passim*.

42. Raghib El-Solh, "Islamist Attitudes Toward Democracy: A Review of the Ideas of al-Ghazali, al-Turabi and 'Amara," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1, May 1993, pp. 57-63; Gudrun Kramer, "Islamist Notions of Democracy," *Middle East Report*, No. 183, July-August 1993, pp. 2-8; more recently, see the

discussion from a former Indonesian president in Abdurrahman Wahid, "Hearts and Minds: Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam," *Wall Street Journal Online*, December 30, 2005, www.wsj.com; available December 30, 2005. For example, the creation of Israel turned the influential Islamist theorist Sayyid Qutb in a much more anti-Western and radical direction. See Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, pp. 8-9.

43. I would like to thank Douglas Lovelace and Steven Metz for pointing out the differences between a military grand strategy and a political grand strategy as I am defining the latter here.

44. Boyd quoted in Dr. Chet Richards, "Grand Strategy," n.p., www.d-n-i-net/fcs/boyd_grand-strategy.htm; available October 9, 2005.

45. For example, see Tom McKenna, "Saints, Scholars, and the Idealized Past in Philippine Muslim Separatism," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 539-553; Michael Laffan, "The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia," *Cambridge Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 3, October 2003, pp. 397-414; Diego Muro, "Nationalism and Nostalgia: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, No. 4, October 2005, pp. 571-589.

46. On communism in particular, see the magnificent work by the late French historian, Francois Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. On Nazism, see Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.

47. Quoted in Lebor and Boyes, p. 103.

48. Quoted in Zuhur, p. 10. The translation in brackets is Zuhur's.

49. Quoted on *CNN.com*, n.p., www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/26/bush; available February 12, 2006.

50. For the classic work on the need for a mixture of idealism and realism in American foreign policy, see Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

51. As I will explain in a book-in-progress on the role of ideology in international politics, there are, of course, political grand

strategies to *maintain* the status quo. But that point is not relevant to the subject under study here. The fundamental difference between the totalitarian and democratic models of political grand strategy is that the former spread their beliefs through violence and hostility against *everyone* who disagrees, while democratic strategy is far more selective and, at least theoretically, based on self-determination through peaceful means. All belief systems, however, are at some point absolutist if their adherents are willing to defend themselves and their system. Democracy is simply far more open, tolerant, and pluralistic than authoritarian or totalitarian forms of government, but it is a matter of degree. If there is a group attempting to overthrow the system violently, for example, democrats usually will demand a right to self-defense. Its relative tolerance, therefore, is, and must be, limited at some point if it is to protect itself when in danger. For general discussions of these points, see Preston King, *The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes*, London: Frank Cass, 1999; John G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

52. Atran Interview with Abu Bakar Bashir, August 2005.

53. Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, edited and introduced by Bruce Lawrence, New York: Verso, 2005, p. 166.

54. Bashir also denies that the first Bali bombing was the work of Jemaah Islamiya, even though the bombers gleefully admitted their crime in open court. Bashir avers that the Israelis and the CIA perpetrated the bombing. Atran Interview with Abu Bakar Bashir, August, 2005.

55. Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, p. 23.

56. Ramakrishna, pp. 33-34.

57. Bin Laden, pp. 126-127.

58. Quoted in Stephen Ulph, "Internet Mujahideen Intensify Internet Research on U.S. Economic Targets," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. III, No. 2, January 18, 2006, n.p., www.jamestown.org; available January 20, 2006.

59. Ramakrishna, p. 42. See also Maya Ranganathan, "Potential of the Net to Construct and Convey Ethnic and National Identities: Comparison of the Use in the Sri Lankan Tamil and Kashmir

Situations," *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 265-280; Ronald Niezen, "Digital Identity: The Construction of Virtual Selfhood in the Indigenous Peoples' Movement," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 47, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 532-551; Birgit Blaucher, "Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Lasker Jihad in Cyberspace," *Australian Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 15, No. 3, December 2004, pp. 267-285; Gary R. Bunt, "Islam@britain.net: 'British Muslim' Identities in Cyberspace," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 3, October 1999, pp. 353-364; Sageman, p. 158; Jake Tapper, "Iraqi Insurgents Increasingly Using Internet as Propaganda Machine," *ABC News Online*, February 14, 2006, n.p., www.abcnews.go.com; available February 14, 2006; for an Indonesian case study, see Merlyna Lim, *Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet*, Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005.

60. Stephen Ulph, "Coming Soon: The 'Voice of the Caliphate' Radio," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 2, No. 17, September 19, 2005, n.p., www.jamestown.org; available December 3, 2005.

61. The Middle East Media Research Institute (hereafter MEMRI), "Now Online: Swear Loyalty to al-Qa'ida Leaders," November 18, 2005, www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP102705; available December 14, 2005.

62. See Stephen Ulph, "Internet Mujahideen Refine Electronic Warfare Techniques," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 3, Issue 5, February 7, 2006, www.jamestown.org; available March 27, 2006.

63. Laurie Mylroie, "The World Trade Center Bomb: Who is Ramzi Yousef? And Why it Matters," *National Interest*, Winter 1995/96, n.p., www.fas.org/irp/world/iraq/956-tni.htm; available February 9, 2006.

64. Cited in David Albright, et. al., "Bin Laden and the Bomb," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 51, No. 1, January/February 2002, pp. 23-24.

65. Eli Lake, "Backlash in Zarqawi's Hometown: Imam: 'Everyone is Ashamed,'" *The New York Sun Online*, November 14, 2005, www.daily.nysun.com; available November 14, 2005; Mark MacKinnon, "Did al Zarqawi Strike Too Close to Home?" *The Globe and Mail Online*, November 12, 2005, www.globeandmail.com; available November 12, 2005; Stephen Ulph, "Zarqawi Threatens Moroccan Diplomats, Ignites Debate Among Clerics," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 2, No. 21, November 14, 2005, www.jamestown.org/

terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369825; available November 14, 2005; Heba Kandil, "Arab Shows Decry Islamists," *Washington Times Online*, November 22, 2005, www.washtimes.com; available November 22, 2005; Tim Regan, "Musharraf Calls for 'Muslim Renaissance': Muslim Summit Also Hears Calls to Ban Groups Preaching Violence," *Christian Science Monitor Online*, December 8, 2005, www.csmonitor.com/2005/1208/dailyUpdate.html?s=mesdu; available December 8, 2005; "Islamists Lose in Malaysian Election," *International Herald Tribune Online*, December 8, 2005, www.ihf.com/articles/2005/12/07/news/malaysia.php; available December 8, 2005; Sheila Bahn, "Indonesian Moderate Warns of Militants," *Washington Times*, May 8, 2006, www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060507-102028-4766r.htm; available May 8, 2006.

66. Quoted from a September 2005 interview in Bergen, p. 379.

67. For the role of mutually hostile ideologies in breeding conflict, a factor that has been largely overlooked in the international relations literature due to the dominance of the Realist paradigm, see Mark L. Haas, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.

68. As Mary Harbeck notes, there are various explanations among the Islamists for the decline of the Muslim world, some emphasizing internal, "near enemy" factors and some emphasizing external, "far enemy" factors. They all believe, however, that Islam is in serious decline. Habeck, pp. 7-15. As we shall see, the dominant tendency in the beginning of the most recent movement was to deal with the "near enemy" first.

69. Like many Indonesians, Sukarno only used one name.

70. Sageman, p. 9.

71. For the history, see Habeck, pp. 17-40; Sageman, pp. 25-35; Gerges, pp. 4-6; Hoffman, Ch. 2. For bin Laden's and the al-Qa'ida leadership's personal intellectual debt to Qutb, see bin Laden, p. 16, fn. 3; Gerges, pp. 4-5; and Bergen, pp. 18-20.

72. Gerges, p. 7. For an accessible, brief overview of Qutb's intellectual evolution and career, see Wright, pp. 7-31.

73. The following account is based roughly on bin Laden's own version, in *Messages to the World*, pp. 133-138; and the overviews found in Berman, pp. 22-51; and Harbeck, pp. 1-32. More generally,

see Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2003.

74. For a general discussion of ideology and Islam, see William E. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 307-335.

75. For radical Islamists' opposition to nationalism, see Ramakrishna, p. 12; Zimmerman, p. 453. Other Islamists, of course, may be ardent nationalists.

76. As with the term liberal, I am defining Globalization and Neoliberal generally. They refer to the adoption of liberal forms of political and economic organization that began to spread, especially, following the end of the Cold War.

77. For subordinate-superordinate identities, see Miles Hewstone, *et. al.*, "Intergroup Bias," *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 53, 2002, pp. 590-591.

78. For the concept of an "imagined community," see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New York: Verso, 1991, p. 5-7. For an account of the evolution of this transnational concept in parts of the Muslim world, see Sageman, pp. 2-3, 18-24. For transnational revolutionary movements more generally, see Mark N. Katz, "Transnational Revolutionary Ideologies," *Society*, Vol. 42, Issue 6, September-October, 2005, pp. 26-30.

79. Anderson, p. 5. The analytical fit is an imperfect one, as Anderson sees such national groupings as replacing religion in Western society. Among the Islamists, religion is an integral part of the community identity. As we have seen, it many times trumps nationalism among them as a motivating identity.

80. "Sedentary" is the term used by Islamists to ridicule those Muslims that will not join them. Zuhur, p. 7. They apparently believe the "sedentary" ones gradually will come around as the strategy works its way in the world. See also Stephen Ulph, "Islamists Criticize Muslims Who Abstain From Jihad," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 3, Issue 7, February 21, 2006, www.jamestown.org; available February 24, 2006.

81. Gerges, pp. 43-79.

82. For the Islam-versus-the-rest model of Islamist thought and a comparison with Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations"

thesis, see Abdelaziz Testas, "Models of Cultural Exclusion and Civilizational Clashes: A Comparison Between Huntington and Siddiqui," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 144, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 175-178.

83. Bin Laden, pp. 123, 202. When challenged by an interviewer if he really meant "even one word," bin Laden insisted that he meant it literally. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

84. As quoted in James S. Robbins, "Al-Qaeda Versus Democracy," *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, No. 9, Fall 2005, www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2005/09/robbins.php#footnotes; available January 12, 2006. See also "Arab Reformists Under Threat from Islamists: Bin Laden Urges Killing of 'Freethinkers'," MEMRI, No. 1153, May 3, 2006, www.memri.com; available May 15, 2006.

85. For an excellent overview of the social psychological literature on social group identity, see Hewstone, *et. al.*, pp. 575-604.

86. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Singapore White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, January 7, 2003, as quoted in Ramakrishna, p. 40. Hereafter referenced as *Singapore White Paper* with page numbers from the original report.

87. Criminal Indictment, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, December 2001 term, Eastern District of Virginia, p. 5, www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/mous_indict.html; available December 3, 2006.

88. Generally, see Gerges, pp. 15, 151-250. See also David Wright-Neville, "Jemaah Islamiyah Split But Still Deadly," *BBC News Online*, October 3, 2005, n.p., www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2983612.stm; available October 3, 2005; "Bali Bomber 'Heads New Group'," *BBC Online*, January 30, 2006, n.p., www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/4661386.stm; available January 30, 2006; "Noordin Claims To Be Leader of New Terror Group," *Jakarta Post Online*, January 31, 2006, n.p., www.thejakartapost.com; available January 31, 2006; "Terror Expert Says JI Split Into Bombing Faction and 'Mainstream' Group," *The Jakarta Post Online*, January 6, 2006, www.thejakartapost.com; available January 6, 2006. The "expert" mentioned in the latter headline is Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group.

89. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996, p. 43.

90. Ken Tsutsumibayashi,, "Fusion of Horizons or Confusion of Horizons? Intercultural Dialogue and Its Risks," *Global Governance*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January-March 2005, pp. 103-114.

91. "Zapatero to Ask Annan's Help for 'Alliance of Civilizations,'" *The Spain Herald*, March 9, 2005, www.spainherald.com/374.html; available February 3, 2006.

92. Quoted in Alan Topol, "Chirac, the Bomb, and Terrorism," *The Washington Times Online*, January 26, 2006, www.washingtontimes.com; available January 26, 2006.

93. Quoted in *ibid*.

94. George Conger, "Study: Germans Pessimistic on Islam," *The Jerusalem Post Online*, May 24, 2006, n.p., www.jpost.com; available May 24, 2006.

95. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 246-265.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

97. Hewstone, *et. al.*, p. 581.

98. Quoted in Genrikh Borovik, *The Philby Files: The Secret Life of Master Spy Kim Philby*, Phillip Knightley, ed., Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1996, p. 363.

99. In addition to Huntington, see the discussion in Sheila L. Croucher, *Globalization and Belonging: The Politics of Identity in a Changing World*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. For the Muslim world, see Ira M. Lapidus, "Between Universalism and Particularism: The Historical Bases of Muslim Communal, National, and Global Identities," *Global Networks*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 37-55. For the growth of a mixed national-European/regional social identity in Malta for comparison, see Anthony M. Abella, "Shaping a National Identity," *International Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 2005, pp. 10-27.

100. For example, Atran Interview with Abu Bakar Bashir, August 2005.

101. For this process in the Abu Sayaaaf group in the Philippines, moving from tribal loyalties to transnational ones, see Dirk J. Barreveld, *Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Laden's Asian Connection*, San Jose, CA: Writers Club Press, 2001, pp. 213-231; Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*, Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public

Affairs, Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000, pp. 204-221; for a more scholarly study, see Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, pp. 89-120. For the linking with Jemaah Islamiya, see Rey Arquiza, "Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiya Team Up To Unleash Terror Campaign," *Philippine Star Online*, October 25, 2002, n.p., www.philstar.com; available December 3, 2005; Jim Gomez, "Muslim Militants Linked to Al-Qaida Form Umbrella Group in Southeast Asia," Associated Press, *TBO.COM*, November 20, 2002, n.p., www.apftbo.com; available December 3, 2005; Maria Ressa, "The Quest for SE Asia's Islamic 'Super' State: 1995 Report Forewarned of US Terror Attacks," *CNN Online*, August 29, 2002, www.cnn.worldnews.com; available January 5, 2006; *idem.*, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*, New York: Free Press, 2003, pp. 25-28, 104-123.

102. Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, pp. 124-142.

103. Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

104. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are translations from Stephen Ulph, "New Online Book Lays Out Al-Qaeda's Military Strategy," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 2, Issue 6, March 17, 2005, n.p., www.jamestown.org; available December 3, 2005. See also Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, "Stealing al-Qai'da's Playbook," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 4, June 2006, pp. 309-321. The entire book has now been translated by William McCants with funding provided by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University and published online by the U.S. Military Academy. See Abu Bakr Naji, William McCants, trans., *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma (sic) Will Pass*, May 23, 2006, www.ctc.usma.edu/Management_of_Savagery.pdf; available June 18, 2006. Barbarism and savagery are differing translations of the same Arabic word.

105. Ulph, "Al-Qaeda's Military Strategy," n.p.

106. *Ibid.*, n.p.

107. Naji, n.p.

108. Quoted in Alan Cullison, "Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive," *The Atlantic Online*, September 2004, n.p., www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/cullison; available December 18, 2005.

109. Gerges, pp. 119-150.

110. For example in Malaysia. See "Voice From Pondok: Malaysian Students Pray for Afghan Warriors," *Shanghai Star*,

November 8, 2001, www.app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2001/1108/fe19-1.html; available March 19, 2006.

111. Gerges, pp. 80-150.

112. Quoted in Gunaratna, p. 224.

113. Jeffrey R. Seul, "'Ours is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 5, September 1999, pp. 553-569.

114. On the desire for certainty in group behavior, see Hewstone, *et. al.*, p. 581. On the appeal of certainty for religious terrorists, see Ramakrishna, pp. 30-33. For the desire for certainty in the captured Islamists in Singapore, see *Singapore White Paper*, p. 17. For a more philosophical treatment, see Tamara Albertini, "The Seductiveness of Certainty: The Destruction of Islam's Intellectual Legacy by the Fundamentalists," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 53, No. 4, October 2003, pp. 455-470.

115. Bin Laden emphasizes the role of youth in Islamist recruitment in *Messages to the World*, p. 203.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

117. The classic work on the subject is Bruce Mazlish, *The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution of a Political Type*, New York: Basic Books, 1977.

118. For the argument that al-Qa'ida is a "civilizational revolutionary" movement, see Robert S. Snyder, "Hating America: Bin Laden as a Civilizational Revolutionary," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 65, No. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 325-349. Snyder believes that bin Laden has failed in this endeavor. Olivier Roy agrees, pp. 1-17. I continue to believe it is still too early to tell, though I agree bin Laden has failed thus far.

119. Bin Laden, *Messages to the World*, p. 124.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

121. "Bin Laden: West Waging a Crusade," *al Jazeera Online*, April 23, 2006, www.english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/FEE6E1E5-DCC0-4E8A-80CF-FFCCA2BC4C2A.htm; available April 23, 2006.

122. Cited in Bergen, pp. 339-340.

123. Atran Interview with Abu Bakar Bashir, August 2005.

124. *Ibid.*

125. As quoted in "Rockets Against Israel 'Ordered by Bin Laden': Iraqi Al-Qaeda Chief," *Agence France Presse*, January 9, 2006, www.breitbart.com; available January 9, 2006.

126. "Murad Investigation," January 7, 1995, p. 7, www.thesmokinggun.com/packageart/fall/murad1.gif; available November 19, 2005.

127. *Singapore White Paper*, p. 15.

128. Quoted in Ramakrishna, p. 45.

129. See bin Laden, *Messages to the World*, pp. 245-275. For the Taliban and Afghanistan specifically, see *ibid.*, pp. 83-86; as the "only" true Islamist state, see p. 143. Thus we can see what bin Laden means generally as the future polity for the *ummah*. As noted above, however, even the Taliban comes in for criticism as being insufficiently strict in implementing the Islamist plan.

130. *Dying to Win*, *passim*. For an excellent critical review of Pape's thesis, see Jeffrey Goodwin, "What Do We Really Know About (Suicide) Terrorism?" *Sociological Forum*, forthcoming. I would like to thank Professor Goodwin for permission to cite the pre-publication version of the article.

131. See the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System for 2005 on the State Department's website, at www.state.gov; available July 18, 2006.

132. Scott Atran "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 3, Summer 2004, p. 68.

133. Pape, p. 21.

134. See his earlier analysis which reaches the same conclusion as his book in Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 341-363.

135. Ulph, "Internet Mujahideen Intensify Internet Research on U.S. Economic Targets," n.p. See also Raphael Perl, Congressional Research Service, "Trends in Terrorism: 2006," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 21, 2006, pp. 8-9. In 2005, approximately 54 percent of global terrorist attacks were against economic targets.

136. The Philippines, which is one of the centers of Islamist and other terrorism in the region—including very important training, safe haven, and supply areas in Mindanao that have been used in support of Islamist groups as well as terror groups such as

the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka that have ravaged the region—is mentioned exactly twice in the text of *Dying to Win*. Both references are to the Philippines in relation to the Japanese *kamikaze* pilots in the 1940s, pp. 13, 35. The only contemporary reference to the Philippines is in a footnote and refers to a 1990 agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front that was never implemented and has been superseded by subsequent agreements. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

137. It is true that the lead bomber of the 2002 Bali bombing, Imam Samudra, stated as a reason: “Australia has taken part in efforts to separate East Timor from Indonesia which was an international conspiracy by followers of the (Christian) Cross,” but that is not the same as “occupation.” It was the largely Christian East Timor’s independence that was resented. Moreover, he frames the attack in civilizational, not nationalist, terms. “Bali Attack ‘Targeted Australians’,” *BBC News Online*, February 10, 2003, www.bbc.news.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/default.stm; available February 25, 2006. It might be noted that in the same story another terrorist claimed he thought they were attacking Americans.

138. Andrew Holt, “Islamists Pose a Growing Threat to Stability in Bangladesh,” *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. III, No. 2, January 18, 2006, n.p., www.jamestown.org; Ronald Buerk, “Bangladesh and Islamic Militants,” *BBC News Online*, February 25, 2005, www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4294147.stm; available January 13, 2006. *idem.*, “Bangladesh’s Escalating Extremism,” *BBC News Online*, November 29, 2005, www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4482320.stm; available November 29, 2005; “Bangladesh Suicide Bombing Kills 8,” *CNN Online*, December 8, 2005, www.cnn.worldnews.com; available December 8, 2005.

139. See Monroe and Kreidie.

140. Bin Laden, *Messages to the World*, p. 155.

141. For this argument, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

142. For this problem in Thailand, for example, see “Mass Protest as Thailand, U.S. Resume Trade Talks,” *The Nation* (Thailand), January 9, 2006, n.p., www.nationmultimedia.com; available January 9, 2006; Kevin Hewison, “Resisting Globalization: A Study of Localism in Thailand,” *Pacific Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 279-296.

143. For the argument that social and economic safety nets are important in nurturing new democracies undergoing the strains of Globalization and market economics, see Nita Rudra, "Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, Issue 4, October 2005, pp. 704-730.

144. "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002/2003, p. 17. I want to thank Robert Snyder for calling my attention to this passage and article. For a broader discussion, see Aurel Croissant, "Changing Welfare Regimes in East and Southeast Asia: Crisis, Change, and Challenge," *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 38, No. 5, October 2004, pp. 504-524.

145. See Kristopher K. Robison, *et. al.*, "Ideologies of Violence: The Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist Transnational Terrorism," *Social Forces*, Vol. 84, No. 4, June 2006, pp. 2009-2026.

146. Bin Laden ludicrously claims that 1,000,000 children died in Iraq because of the sanctions regime. *Messages to the World*, p. 117.

147. As quoted in Reuel Marc Gerecht, "The Gospel According to Osama bin Laden," *The Atlantic Online*, January 2002, n.p., www.theatlantic.com/doc/200201/gerecht; available February 21, 2006. Bin Laden made similar comments in February 2003, *Messages to the World*, pp. 192-193.

148. Bin Laden, *Messages to the World*, p. 141.

149. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, New York: Pantheon, 2006, pp. 65-66. Saddam's views come from a secret report by U.S. intelligence services based on interviews with top Iraqi officials after the war. The Pentagon subsequently released the report. See Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Psasc, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James E. Lacey, *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*, at www.foreignaffairs.org/special/iraq/ipp.pdf; available July 13, 2006. The views expressed here can be found on pp. 15-16, and p. 20, fns. 79, 80.

150. For an influential critique of the role of reputations in international politics, see Jonathan Mercer, *Reputations and International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. See also Ted Hopf, *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American*

Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

151. "Letter From al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005," Director of National Intelligence, *www.DNI.gov*; available January 12, 2006. The authenticity of this letter has been debated, but the U.S. Government stands by it. For an Iraq War critic's acceptance of its authenticity, see former CIA analyst Michael Scheur, "In Depth: The Al-Zawahiri-Al-Zarqawi Letter: Al-Qaeda's Tactical and Theater-of-War Concerns," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. II, Issue 21, November 14, 2005, n.p., *www.Jamestown.org*; available March 12, 2006.

152. Pape, *Dying to Win*, p. 249.

153. See the remarks of Representative John Murtha (D-PA) on "Meet the Press" as viewed on June 18, 2006.

154. U.S. troops were in Saudi Arabia, of course, as part of the sanctions regime against Saddam in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. When the dictator was removed, the deterrent was no longer necessary and American troops largely were removed. Paul Wolfowitz interview with Sam Tannenhaus, May 9, 2003, at *www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html*; available June 11, 2006.

155. Quoted in Michael L. Scheur, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002, p. 107, cited in Robert S. Snyder, "September 11 and International Politics: Before and After," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in San Diego, CA, March 2006, fn. 7.

156. Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, "Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 161-176.

157. Tsutsumibayashi, p. 112.

158. Robison, *et. al.*, pp. 2009-2026.

159. See Bijana Scott, "Whose Story Wins? Relevance Theory and Public Diplomacy," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in San Diego, CA, March, 2006. The paper is available on the Association's website, *www.isanet.org*; available April 22, 2006.

160. For example, Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006.

161. See Stephen Schwartz, "Radical Roadshow: The British Try to Counter Radical Islam With Slightly Less Radical Islam," *The Daily Standard Online*, January 31, 2006, n.p., www.weeklystandard.com; available February 9, 2006. See also, Bright, *passim*.

162. Quoted in Pew Foundation, "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other," June 22, 2006, www.pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/253.pdf; available September 18, 2006.

163. For a positive argument for dual identity, see Andrew Mason, "Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation," *Ethics*, Vol. 109, No. 2, October 1999, pp. 261-287.

164. The Indonesian conflict in Aceh is more ethno-national and economic than religiously based. Yet it did include issues of "dual identities." The recent agreement allows Aceh to use its own regional flag, crest, and national hymn, and keep a larger share of its petroleum income. However, Jakarta will still control the province's finances, defense, and foreign policy. See Esther Pan, "The Aceh Peace Agreement," *Council of Foreign Relations*, September 15, 2005, n.p., www.cfr.org/publication/8789/indonesia.html#4; available December 22, 2005; *International Crisis Group*, "Aceh: A New Chance for Peace," Asia Briefing No. 40, August 15, 2005, pp. 1-18, www.crisisgroup.org; available October 12, 2005; Edward Aspinall, "The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?" Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006, www.ciaonet.org/pbei/ewc/ewc013/; available July 22, 2006. For an overview of the Aceh issue in Indonesian history, see Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. For the potential prospects for a similar agreement in the southern Philippines, which appear to have lessened at the time of writing, see Zachary Abuza, "Crunchtime for the Mindanao Peace Process?" February 8, 2005, *U.S. Institute of Peace*, n.p., www.usip.org/index.html; available December 23, 2005; Astrid S. Tuminez, "Ancestral Domain: The Key to a More Permanent Peace in Mindanao," February 8, 2005, *U.S. Institute of Peace*, n.p., www.usip.org/index.html; available June 2006; "Philippines Near Muslim Treaty," *Bangkok Post Online*, May 30, 2006, n.p., www.bangkokpost.com; available May 30, 2006.

165. Aurel Croissant, "Unrest in Southern Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences since 2001," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 27, No. 1, April 2005, pp. 21-43.

166. On the potential risks and benefits in "ethnofederalism," see Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective," *World Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 2002, pp. 245-276.

167. Quoted in David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith, "Greetings From the Cybercaliphate: Some Notes on Homeland Insecurity," *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5, October 2005, p. 929.

168. See Marc Lacey, "Alliance of Somali Warlords Battles Islamists in Capital," *New York Times Online*, May 13, 2006, n.p., www.nytimes.com; available May 13, 2006. The article concerns Somali "warlords" who joined the American-led LWT against local radical Islamists they believed are protected by the Somali "government." It appears some of them had previous aid relationships with the United States. The U.S. Government has neither confirmed nor denied involvement with the "warlords" at the time of writing, according to the BBC. "Has 'War on Terror' Reached Somalia?" *BBC News Online*, May 11, 2006, n.p., www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/4841170.stm; available July 19, 2006. See also, Anouar Boukhars, "Understanding Somali Islamism," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. IV, No. 10, May 18, 2006, n.p., www.jamestown.org; available May 24, 2006.

169. Marc Lacey, "Islamic Militants Declare Victory in Mogadishu," *New York Times Online*, June 5, 2006, n.p., www.nytimes.com; available June 5, 2006. At the time of writing, it is unclear which social identity will predominate in Somalia, clan or Islamist, even in the short run, but the Islamists appear to have won.

170. For an overview of the history of such complexities, see Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.